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ABSTRACT

The epistemological
thesis

problem that

is the separation

is known.

Generally,

dichotomy."

vehicle

problem is called

subject-object

_this

Maurice Merleau-Ponty,

knower.

The purpose

chapter,

embodiment,

including

perception,

as well

epistemology,
other

persons,

between

present

study

intentional,

phenomenologist,

the knower and the
dimen~ion

of the active

is to examine whether

I explicate

of traditional

as nis exploration

and

special

of the importance

and ourselves.

by Merleau-Ponty,
active

knower.
ii

of the body

philosophy

to

to our knowledge of the world,

I conclude

by viewing

of

In the second

of Merleau-Ponty's

attention

philoso phy of

theories

to the act of knowing.

the application

giving

Merleau-Ponty's

that

the epistemic

between the knower and the known can be overcome,
proposed

from

of the body can be said to eliminate

his critique

of language

I trace

as a passive

dichotomy.

In the first

chapter,

French

the body as a crucial

philosophy

the subject-object

as the

with the mind separated

a contemporary

of this

how Merleau-Ponty's

that

of knowledge E,I_the body.

to overcome the separation

and the role

of merely

Thus one has been left

known by understanding

"the

only the mind bas been considered

the body and from the objects

has sought

in this

from the object

the body has been thought

of data.

investigate

of the knowing subject

Traditionally

knower, while

I shall

along

gap

the lines

the body at the outset

as an
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of Embodiment

INTRODUCTION

The epistemological
thesis

problem that

is the separation
Generally

dichotomy."

In traditional

Descartes,

this

problem is called
epiatemologies,

Locke and Kant,

be the mind alone.
knowledge through

Even empiricists,
the senses,

as an active

knower at all.

the body, and further

that

the "subject-object
for example those

the senses

of

is presumed to

who claim that

understand

we attain
as mere vehicles

Thus the body is not

knower, or for that

One is then left,

in this

from the object

the knowing subject

of data which are known with the mind.
considered

investigate

of the knowing subject

•
L-l
1.s
a.uown.

Plato,

I shall

first

matter

as a part

of the

with the mind separated

with the mind separated

from the objects

from
to be

known.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty
phenomenolgist,

has sought

knower and the known.
nerleau-Ponty
death

(1908-1961),

never

lt

to overcome the distance
should

finished

perhaps

of Truth,

that

which was originally

was eventually

published

and the Invisible.

his earlier

works from which to work toward a fresh

dichotomy.

Naturally

the application
question

questions,

There is,

especially

what follows

The epistemic

distance

that

that

however,

entitled

under the title
ample material
approach

to

of the subject-object

is only a suggestion

of Merl eau-Ponty's

of the "epistemic

between the

At the time of his

The Visible

epistemological

French

be noted at the outset

his epistemology.

he was working on a manuscript,

The Origin

a contemporary

philosophy

concerning

of the body to this

gap" between the knower and the known.
between the knower and the known may

1

in

2
perhaps

be overcome by viewing

overlap

between the subject

the body as a point

and the object

for the body to serve

as a .connection

knowing relationship,

it must be thought

essential

dimension

among other
construed

in the world.

as a body-subject,

Furthermore,
the relationship

between

this

understanding

The terms he uses
relationship

strongly

of the role
this

an interactive

an active,

with the passive,

relationship

than as an object
the body is

intentional

to redefine

being.

the nature
of

view of the above

relationship

"lived,"

of

of the body in knowledge.

fresh

of interdependence
as:

"r e ciprocal,"

"inhabited,"

11
and "coition.'
"co111D1union,

suggest

and

the knower and the known on the basis

"inter-subjective,"

"communication,"
clearly

has sought

He employs such descriptions

"dialogical,"

In order

of as an active
rather

or

two terms of the

For kerleau-Ponty

to characterize

suggest

and symbiosis.

between these

a meaning-seeking,

Merleau-Ponty

distinctive

of knowledge.

of the knowing subject,

objects

of intersection

_12 Such descriptions

two-way relationship

one-directional

which const r asts

character

of the

between the knower and the known in traditional

epistemolo~ies.
Perhaps
might serve
poles

as a helpful

comprising
analogy

wi t hin such a force-field

in relation
exist,

the dynamics

to each other.

so does the other.

subjected

to extensive

can never

be isolated

Nevertheless,

it

an electromagnetic

here.

When either

analysis

of these

either

the case that

apart
there

and negative
and significance

poles

ceases

of the poles

in and of itself

nor understood

remains

The positive

only have existence

Although

force-field

can be

in the abstract,

from the other

a~e

to

~

poles,

it

pole.
each with

3
a distinct
other.

identity
So it

and character;

is with the relationship

known in Merleau-Pon t y's
identity

they are never absorbed

same entity.

Although

each gets

in relation

to the other,

they are !.!2, interdependent

Rather,

each

between the knower and the

epistemology.

and significance

into

its

they are not the
poles

of one

reality.
The focus of this
of traditional
it.

study,

epistemology

then,

and Merleau-Ponty's

What I hope to show is that

and perhaps

only by, taking

know~ng subject
epistemic

object

to overcome

one can overcome this

dichotomy

the body of the knower seriously

and not merely

as an object

the body as the axis

as the intersection

among other

by,

as a

objects.

The

by

around which the dynamic of knowing

wherein

the knowing subject

and the known

meet.
Merleau-Ponty

phenomenology,

was an author

of a wide variety

socio-political

philosophy,

psychology.

The main attention

of this

to his early

major work, Phenomenology.£!.

1945),

in which he developed

following
Perception

additional

texts

(a collection

his
will

(1948),

and The Visible~

the Invisible

literature

the most recent

includes

kerleau-Ponty's

philosophy,

The main interpreters

John Sallis,

Ri~hara

Zaner,

present

written

Signs (1960),
(1961).

be given

(written

of embodiment.
~

in
The

Primacy of

over a period

of years),

Prose of the World (1961),
The principal

American commentators

especially
are:

and

study will

Perception

also be used:

of essays

of works in

aesthetics,

philosophy

Sense and Non-Sense

work.

effort

dichotomy

gap between t~e knower and the known is bridged

interpreting
pivots,

is the subject-object

on the role

Mary Rose Barral,

secondary
on

of the body in his
John F. Bannan,

Remy C. Kwant, ~nd Samuel B. Mallin.

NOTtS
lNTRODUCTIO~
1.

The aspect of epistemology
under consideration
here does not
pertain
to questions
of truth,
justification
or beliet.
Its
focus is on the knowing process itself
at the experiential,
first-order
level.

2.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty,
Phenomenology ot Perception,
~mith (New York: RW11anities Press, 1962), pp. lb5,
304, 311 and 320, - respectively.

4

tr. Colin
354, 352,

Chapter
Merle au-Ponty's

First

of all,

Merleau-Ponty's

difficulties

critique

perceptual

accounts

of perceptual

including

A

Critique

his

perception

as it

made up of sensory
separate,

units

"atomistic

philosophy

occurs.

of embodiment

of language.

Theories

of Perception

empiricism,

reduces

according

account

Empiricism

and thereby

blocks,"

is the

knowledge and then move on

it does not take into

actually

and it

in terms of the body as a

of Traditional

is that

form the

begin by trac i ng Merleau - Ponty's

The main problem with traditional
Merleau-Ponty,

as well

to the problem of

the philosophy

that

of his own account

approaches

writes,

l will

system,

l.

traditions

of

and rationalism,

and the object

and resolve.

of these

to a treatment

the subject

which Merleau-Ponty

of these

aims to clarify

to begin with an outline

These three

between

against

of Embodiment

of both empiricism

epistemology.

the relationship

Philosophy

is important

criticism

as of Kant's

background

it

One

treats
perception

which is both confusing

to

the structure
experience

of
as

into
and inaccurate.

Pure sensation
wi'll be the experience
of an
undi ff erentia t ed instantaneous,
dotlike
impact.
It is
unnecessary
to show, since authors are agreed on it, that
this notion corresponds
to nothing in our experience,
and
that the most rudimentary
factual
perceptions
that we are
acquainted
with, in creatures
such as the ape and the hen,
have a bearing on relationships
and not on any absolute
1
terms.
Traditional
experience
a whole.

empiricism

sensations,

does not take

not as isolated

We do not have

units,

·pure sensations"

11

5

into ·account

but,

that

we

but always as parts
rather,

experiences

of

6
1n relationa.hip

1e 1Cl· 1 • 112

l'hus,

1n isolation,

dressed.

to these

sensations,

cold because

account

receiver

sensory

forms part

always

of redness

that

instantaneous,
for knowledge,

of data

bombardment.

provides

of a

or coldness
on a

if perception

their

concept

of t~e

no way to get beyond

view of mind, as

of redness,

squareness

and

smoothness

are drawn,

involves . no dynamic by means of which we pull

individual

sensations

together

Empiricism
account

tries

for the possibility

introducing

the concept

impressions,

however,

impressions

merely

of perception.!!.

record

associates

of sensations

and knowledge by

Mere association
for how a cluster

or significant

object

of
of

of knowledge.

does not cause my min<l to apprehend

a unified

a group of individual

sensations,

and thereby

experience

of "association."
does not account

wholes.

difficulty,

of integrated

becomes a meaningful

The mere grouping
the object

into meaningful

to deal with this

whole;

my mind would then

sensa t ions.

and which sensations

How a mind groups

i t clusters

toge t her,

why are the crucial

epistemological

questions · which empiricism

to answer.

these

do not even arise

Pooty's

In fact

approach.

questions

As he himself

is

11

dotlike

For the empiricist

onto which impressions

is

we are inadequately

acknowledge

"undifferentiated,

mind as a passive

a tabula..!:!!!_

it

'something'

but we might see a red ball

even empiricists

one cannot

meaningless

else,

a context,

or we might feel
Although

reduced

"The perceptual

we do not have a sensation

without

table

white

experiences.

1n the middle of something

always
If.

to other

within

or
and

f ails
Merleau-

says:

the significance
of the percept,
far from resulting
from
an association,
is in fact presupposed in all associat i on,
whether it concerns the perception
of a fi§ure before one,
or the recollection
of former experiences.

If we co nfine ourselves
to phenomena, the unity _ of the
thing in perc eption is not arriv ed at by association,
but
is a conditio n of association,
and as such precedes the
deiimitation
s whach establish
and verify it, and indeed
precedes itself.
The significance

and unity

of an object

of knowledge,

then,

not drawn onto a "bl an k tablet " of the mind by the sensations
in the phencmena l flow of experience
meaningful.

The mind cannot

associated

perceptions.

or more properly

percepts

problem that

the percepts

understands
associated
account

experience
clusters

as comprised

sensations

themselves,

problematic

implications

empiricism's

separation

to be mentioned.

to the known object

which Merleau-Ponty
into

the "cultural
it,

the

The basic
it

empiricism
that

cannot

the knower

is not part
for.

sees

of the
Some of the

folloiwng

atomistic
world,"

is not allowed

of the

sensations,

and thus goes unaccounted

calls

wherein

is that

any significance

To begin with,

as Merleau-Ponty

As such,

of experience

meaningful

at the outset.

of atomistic

of impressions.

in relation

even of

categories

sense,

sees with empiricism

for knowledge because

experiences

into

sense of static

meaningful

Merleau-Ponty

er,

in the knowing subject,

in the relational

are experienced.!!

recei

between the knower and the

and organizes

but rather

, but

is perceived.!!

a passive

There is something

This is not in the Kantian

understanding,

world"

be merely

in the relationship

known, which selects
wholes.

an object

is

from

sensations

need

or the "human

for in empiricism.

F'pr most of us Nature is no more than a vague and remote
entity,
overlaid
by cities,
roads, houses and above all by
the presence of other people.
Now, for empiricism,
"cultural"
objects and faces owe their distinctive
form,
their magic power, to transference
and projection
of
memo~y, 30 only by accident has the human world any
meaning.

7

8
According
fact,

to Merleau-Ponty,

perceive

etc.

discern

fail

anger or pain in a face rather

when we too were feeling

face,

empiricists

angry or hurt

Merleau-Ponty

in a closed

objects

fist,

to note

and had such a look on our
a meaning which we

is inferred

from introspection

and memory, which is the only way empiricism

can account

significance.

anger,

Instead,

he claims

are embodied in the look,
We do not infer

fear,

as it were.

given

The "natural

world"

to Merleau-Ponty.

is also

As he puts

it

or the "human world,"

is hidden
falsified

mouth, etc.

we experience

So the cultural

of our existence,

for such

joy and the like

in the shape of the eyebrows,

the meaning of such expressions,

"pre-critically,"
as a basic

that

we, in

than remember the time

to the idea that

for example,

that

from us by empiricism.

by empiricism,

according

it:

••• the nature about which empiricism talks is a collection
of stimuli and qualities,
and it is ridiculous
to pretend
that nature thus conceived is, even ig intention,
merely
the primary object of our perception.
In empiricism,
as a kind

nature

of scientific

experience

impressions.

In life

we naturally
stimuli

object.

Only in rare

instances,

might we not "see"

the trick

ball,

precisely

and only because

being

perhaps

data

to be experie nced
in actual

or stimuli.

If that

of gaps and unrelated
in the gaps,

even though we

Let me illustrate
let

it

with an

be the tennis

of it at any one time and from any

we experience

instance,

however,

at an object,

see a part

Nevertheless,

fill

from them.

When we are looking

we only actually

one angle.

Nature,

our world would be full

may not be receiving

ball,

object.

world is said

is not made up of individual

were the case,

example.

or the natural

the ball

as in a trick-shop

the whole ball.

experience

rounded

window, for

As a matter

only a half-shell,

we initially

as a fully

of fact,

works as a trick
it

as a whole

9
ball.

Therefore,

dealt

with as so-c~lled

does not infer
mask-like

in the natural
11

world objects

from memory that

facade,

11

scientific

are not discovered

objects.

A newly born baby

the nurturer's

but experiences

and

face is not a

it as a face full

of meaning rather

. 1i.· 7
t h an stimu

Merleau-Ponty
background

makes the same point

in a paintin&,

in relation

11

to the

hidden

:.

The phenomenon pf the background's
continuing
under
figure,
and being seen upder _ the figure - when in fact
is covered by the · figure - ~ phenomenon which embraces
whole problem of the presence of the object,
is equally
obscured by empiricism,
whicg treats
this covered part
the background ,s inyisible.
Therefore,

our experience

stimuli-like

se~sations,

of our natural
since

from which we are not receiving

empiricism

very well

we do in fact
any data.

often

perceive

of

things

In Merleau-Ponty's

summarizes Merleau-Pon t y's
in the following

the
it
the

world is not made up on

The hysterical
child who turps around
world behind him is still
there'
(Schaler,
Selbsterkenntnis,
p. 85) suffers
from no
images, but the perceived world has lost
original
structure
that ensures that for
its h~dden aspects are as indubitable
as
ones.
Mary Rose Barral

11

words:

'to see if the
Idole der
deficiency
of
for him that
the normal person
are its visible

critique

of

paragraph:

-

••• empiricism is a prolongation
of the naive, realistic
approach to reality,
a sort of systematization
of that
external
reality
which the common man asserts,
with which
one communicates only through the senses, exteriorly
••• the
laws, having
world is a reality
in itself,
ruled by certain
certain
properties
independent of the subject experiencing
it ••• to empiricism the fundamental element for the
description
of the phenomena is lacking:
that of the indiss~luable_unioy0between
subject and the world from which
meaning

According
epistemological

derives.

to Merleau-Ponty,
tradition

empiricism

which has crucial

is not the only

difficulties.

Rationalism,

or what be calls

wrong-headed.

Re puts

it

"intellectualism,"

this

is also

10

seen a s

way:

Both emp1r1c1sm and rationalism
take the objective
world
as the object of their analysis,
when this comes first
neither
in time nor in virtue of its meaning; and both are
incapable of expressing
the peculiar . way in which the
perceptual
consciousness
constitutes
its object.
Both keep
their distance
in relatiyn
to perception,
instead of
sticking
cl~sely to it.
Neither
perception
"objective"
perception

empiricism
seriously

nor rationalism_

enough.

transaction.
seriously

at all,

pre-existent
slave

serves

for it all

ideas.

objects
like

of knowledge
Plato,

Consider,

sense
of

for example,

of geometrical

questions

of

as an

for the "recollection"

whose recollection
by Socrates'

structure

does not take

For some rationalists,

knowledge o_f eternal

triggered

in fact,

only as an occasion

boy in the~.

merely

because

the actual

at a distance,

Both keep it

kationalism,

are in the mind as ideas.
perception

takes

and figures

truth

the
was

drawn in the

sand.
The main problem with rationalism,
is this

very pre-existence

"Forms" or simply

of knowledge,

in Cartesian

views the mind as "over-enriched,"
as empty or "under-enriched."

accord i ng to Merleau-Ponty,

innate

whether

ideas.

whereas
Merleau-Ponty

in the world of

The intellectualist
the empiricist
puts

it

viewed it

in the following

manner:
Where empir Lcism was deficient
was in any connection
between the object and the act which it triggers
otf.
What
intellectualism
lacks is contingency
in the occasions of
thought.
In the first
case consciousness
is too poor, in
the second too rich for any phenomenon to appear compelling
to it.
Empiricism cannot see that we need to know what we
are looking for, otherwise we would not be looking fo r 1t,
and int e llectualism
fails
to see that we need to be
ignorant of wha t Y2are looking for, or equally we should
not be searching.

must

addition,

of knowledge are in the mind as innate

if

the basic

or pre-existent

ideas,

However, since

intellectualist

ought to be no possibility

from the rationalist

become the chief
account

In

of error.

to knowledge are not incorrigible,

missing

then,

for knowledge.

l

there

our claims

must be something
and error,

objects

search

11

Thus, even the intellectualist

stumbling

of human knowledge.

account.
blocks

there
Discovery

for an

As Mallin

writes:

••• this ego cannot make mistakes or be fpoled by illusions
or falsehoods,
for its experiences
have the clarity
of
ioeas and can thus be exhaustively
thematized and grasped
by means of cognitive
categories.
Merleau-Ponty
frequently
criticizes
this theory both because it makes illusion
and
error impossible,
and thus equates appearance and
reality,
and because there is nothing in our experience
that correfyonds
to such immanent, apodictic,
or "absolute
evidence. 11
If empiricism
not leave

fails,

according

room for any reflection

to Merleau-Ponty,
about our sensations,

associating

them as they come, intellectualism

reflections

are devoid

of any sensations.

agree with Kant when it
blind

because

its

1s empty because
Another
empiricism

problem,

have no guiding

"concepts"
according

and rationalism

of knowledge,
known.

its

lies

more sp e cifically

As he himself

states

fails

have nothing

because

reflection

its

seems to

and rationalism;

one is

and the other

on which to reflect.

to Merleau-Ponty,
1n their

it does

merely

Merleau-Ponty

comes to empiricism

"percepts"

because

relationship

in the production

with both

to the object
of that

which is

it:

••• the two doctrines,
then, have this idea in common that
attention
creates nothing,
since a world of impressions
in
itself
or a universe of determininf
thought are equal~y
4
independent
of the action of mind.
Although

at first

it would seem that

intellectualism

could not be

12
guilty

of considering

of thought

are innately

mind itself,

the mind is not,

light

path.

intellectualism,

cannot

cannot

the objects
known by the

view, actively

The attention

of the mind is more like

shines

that

The light

upon anything

of the mind, according

stop and consider

or go back to a , pr evious
understood

since

in Merleau-Ponty's

which passively

predetermined

passive,

in the mind and are therefore

with the ideas.

involved
search

the mind as merely

a given

one out of interest

discriminate

.

falls

in its

to

object

Attention

and choose among its

a

of thought,
thus

objects.

Consciousness
is no less intimately
linked with objects of
which it is unheeding than with those which interest
it,
and the additional
clearness
brought by the act of
attention
does not herald any new relationship.
It
therefore
becomes once more a light which does not change
its chaiscter
with the various objects which it shines
upon •••
In intellectualism,
possible.
alone,

Perception
since

said

along with hats
hats

springs?
according
half

on their

Yet I judge

on the basis

of sensations

with which to interpret

heads:

the stimuli.

which may cover ghosts
them to be real

in water,

it

walking

" ••• what do I see from the window,

to the intellectualist

men."

or dummies worked by

16

perspective,

In the same way,
when we see a stick

looks bent but we judge

straight.

Thus, what we perceive

Perception

ends where judgment

Merleau-Ponty

in to make perception

when he looked out the window on the people

and coats

submerged

is brought

is not possible

one needs something

As Descartes

except

'judgment'

often

begins.

differs

it

to be

from how we judge

It is with this

poi nt t hat

disagrees.

. p

The result
is t hat intellectualist
makes nonsense of the perceptual

analysis
eventually
phenomena which it is

it.

13
designed to elucidate.
While judgment loses ita
constitutive
function and becomes an explanatory
principle,
the words 'see,'
'hear,'
and 'feel'
lost all their meaning,
since the least significant
vision outruns the pure
impression f~d thus comes under the general heading of
'Judgment.'
_
Merleau-Ponty

maintains

intimat el y connected.
bent in water,

actually

pacing
1 .

t h e sensation.

dimension
arise

sense

enables

therefore,

of it.

there."

Sallis

as being

of it

us to judge

not separate

Our intellectual

out of or take place

acknowle dge that

the stick

perceptions

that

reflection
states

guide

18

us in

Thus a

from perception,

way.

but is a

do not,

a vacuum.

to look

straight

in a certain

capacities

within

are very

which is set

. .
we are present 1y receiving.

of sensations

is,

and judgment

to the stick

we experience

we have no other

Judgment

perception

With respect

because

combination

that

after

Intellectualism

all,
fails

to

grows out of a world which is "already

this

point

in the following

fashion:

The philosophy of reflection
fails to take account of our
"natural
bond" with the world, of that intrinsically
opaque
link to thing which is already established
when reflection
comes upon the scene ••• ~hat is required
is a reflecti on
which proceeds in full recognition
of the tact that it
takes pla ce only within the compasf of an always already
9
constituted
presence to the world.
In spite

of the fact

too,

fails

dichotomy.
intuitions
experience,

i st standoff,

to resolve

epistemology

view,

inherent

although

s perspective

experience,

still

equipped

of the understanding
functions

For Kant the knowing subject

it,

in the subject-object
with the

of space and time which organ i ze the sensory
and the categories

was

the

from Merleau-Ponty'

the difficulties

Mind, in Kant's

our conceptual
manner.

Immanuel Kant's

taken as a way of overcoming

of fe red and is often
empiricist-rational

that

manifold

which stru ct ure

in an essentially

is not actively

of

seeking

pa ssive

14
knowledge,

is not searching.

the other

aspects

concepts

rather

Space,

of our cognitive

with the known.

or process

of knowing itself.

rationalism

fail _s to "attach

ignorance,

that

is attention

still

itse1t.

In his

Kant tails

Even a synthesis
due importance

E.f~

"always

of all

Kant tried

there,"

to bring

relationship,
itself.

experienced

it. 1121 Furthermore,

already

and

circumscribed

determinate

intention

which

it

apprehend
myself

but only succeeded

the

than they had been

the subject,

Kant's

subject

and object

As

or consciousness,

anything

as existing

while

is

of knowledge.

by

as existing
in the act of

the world for Mer~eau-Ponty

is "lived,"

the subject

Merleau-Ponty

together

to bring

with the object

"Kant detached

I could not possibly

apprehending

to that

Nevertheless,

relationship

says:

I first

of empiricism

Reason Kant attempted

or rationalism.

not in a constructive

unless

to the act

1120

empiricism

showing that

and inter-

to pay attention

empty but already

Critique

Merleau-Ponty

along with

remain abstract

relationally

knowing mind and the known world closer
in either

and causation,

scaffolding,

than functioning

dependently

time,

for Kant it

of knowledge

in unify i ng t he subject

is

is not.
into

a clo s er

with in

writes: .

What distinguishes
intentionali
ty f r om the Kant ian relation
to a possible
object is that th e un it y of the world ••• is
lived as ready-made or already made. Kant himself shows i n
the Critique£!.
Judgment that there exists a unity of the
imagination
and the 22derstanding
and a uni t y of subje c ts
before the object .••
A distance

remains

between

the kno~er and the known in Kant's

epistemology,

especially

as found in his

kno~n object

is regarded

as independently

is understood

as existing

on its

own prior

first

Critique,

real.
to its

In other

since

the

words,

involvement

it

with

-15
the knowing subject.
and identity

completely

Therefore,

outsiae

as a thing-in-itself,
ot a relationship

the two, the world and the subject

possibility,
Mallin

The object,

indeed,

the necessity,

has reality
with any subject.

are separated

of a dichotomy

and the

remains.

As

remarks:
' Although Kant gives us a better understanding
of the unity
of the subje c t and the world by making the function of
subjectivity
transcendental,
both he and liusserl are also
criticized
for taking as r2al the multiplicity
that is
outside the consciousness.
3

We shall
general,

see later

on that

and in his epis t emology in particular,

the crucial
reality

notion.

relationship

Merleau-Ponty
world,

That is to say,

to the other.

is critical

which exists

can be conceived

of Kant's

independently

In conclusion,

assumption
of a perceiving

could not be conceived
Merleau-Ponty

room for any critical

respect

to the clustering

of sense

reflection.
awareness

it

leaves

of the world as lived

and already

by Merleau-Ponty

primordial

to all

analysis.

In addition,

to provide

a true

synthesis

of empiricism

According

to Merleau-Ponty,

reflection

for not taking

Kant cannot

with

and he is dissatisfied

allow

criticized

were the case,

with the empiricism

no room for anything

Nor does intellectualism

that

of at all.

it does not leave

because

is because

or knowing subject,

is dissatisfied

data,

and

the noumenal

If this

because

rationalism

that

is

identity

each is ~hat it

real.

in

"relationality"

This is the reason

of as independently

the thing-in-itself

philosophy

The knower and the known get their

from each other.

of its

in Merleau-Ponty's

other

with

than such

for our pre-reflective
there.
into

Kant,

account

in turn,

the world as

he is chastized

for tailing

and intellectualism.
regard

is

the noumena as

16

independently

real

and at the same time claim to have bridged

between the knower and the known.
undercuts

By maintaining

the gap

the former he

the latter.

The main difficulty,
epistemologies
inter-dependent
predicated

is their

then,
failure

relationship

with all

of these

to posit

or arrive

epistemology,

active,

intentional,

closely

at the role

an eye to seeing

however,

meaning-seeking

as active.

how it claims

In

the knowing subject

body.

is an

Let us now look more

ot the body in Merleau-Ponty's

the knower and the known.

at an

between the knower and the known

on a view of the knowing subject

Merleau-Ponty's

traditional

philosophy,

to overcome the epistemic

with

gap between
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2.

A Philosophy

There are five main points
role

of the Body

in Merleau-Ponty's

of the body which seem to me to pertain

the subject-object

dichotomy

body as an object

in epistemology.

in the world,

synthesis

of one's

(l)

directly

of the

to the t opic of

They are:

(l)

the body as a subject,

(2)

and (4) the motility

spatiality

discussion

of one's

the
the

(3)

own body, and (5 ) the

own body.

At one point

Merleau-Ponty

the prevailing

focuses

view of

the body i n the foll owing fashion:
The definition
of the object is ... that it exists
partes
extra partes,
and that consequently
it acknowledges between
its parts, or between itself
and other ~bjects,
only
2
external
and mechanical relationships.
This is how modern physiology

view,

mechan i stic

regarding

highl y complex machine.
concerned,

an object

losing

losing

a tire.

out,

without

there

certain

to experience
his

legs

a person

parts.

sen s ation

in his

for example,

non-existent

legs

knee itches.
according

physiology

though

is
to a car,

a leg is simply

the "phantom-leg

leg.

syndrome.

a leg nevertheless

I have a friend

that,

physiology,

points

11

In

continues

who lost

war and now has artificial

because

an itch

another,

However, as Merleau-Ponty

who has lost

in the Finno-Russo

It has a very

of her body is comparable

A person without

the non-existent

to a mechanistic

explainable

a part

one of its

According

gets,

the human body as simply

is a phenomenon called

instances

our bodies.

As far as mechanistic

a person

for example,

understands

both of

legs.

he ought not now have any

they are not there.

however,

on his knee;

that

This feelin&

in a phantom limb is not

to a mechanistic

is to say,

he often

his

model of the human body,

18
because

we ought not feel

This feeling
of a simple
impulses

things

in a phantom limb cannot

stimulus-response

itself

model will

Merleau-Ponty

gives

touched

by a hair,

and less

precise

that

there

at all

mechanistic

specific

brain

without

physiology
purely

lost

sufficient,

no psychological
of the nerves

the loss
because

hot and cold.

is being moved around and
seem to indicate

stimuli

versa,

explanation

in a

do not always create

sometimes

that

sensations

a

are

if a mechanistic

ought

to be able

may experience
belief,

of a limb.

perhaps

to do so.

pains,

itches,

a memory-image,
Such explanations

a

Mentalism
etc.

in a

or simply
are not

if one were to cut the appropriate

the phantom limb experiences

to the brain

a much broader

stimulus.

of an erroneous

in the brain,

becomes less

the phantom limb phenomenon,

a person

however,

but

skin may be repeatedly

Such examples

and, vice

explain

that

stimulated

as alternatively

Certain

psychology

to accept

extreme,

as touching

now, one is led to think

limb because

refusal

nerves

manner.

mentalistic

would maintain

25

Therefore,

in which the body does not function

the corresponding

cannot

are no nerve

the localization

is felt

is felt.

sensation

Naturally,

until

the stimulus

are instances

on the basis

than a purely

A person's

is experienced

thinks

strictly

felt

of it.

and the hair

nothing

entity

At the opposite

for example,

Then the feeling

finally

there

the example of someone being

to have a sensation

the person

since

organic

allow.

ceasing

Later

be explained

from the leg in question.

is a far deeper

psychological

area.

mechanism,

coming to the brain

the brain

in limbs which do not exist.

can overlook
abolishes

the tact

would cease.
that

"But

the severance

the phantom limb. 1126 Therefore,

a

Merleau-Ponty

concludes

phenomenon must lie
physiology

that

the explanation

somewhere between,

19

of the phantom limb

or in a combination

of,

and psychology.
In order to describe
the belief
in the phantom limb and the
unwillingness
to accept mutilation,
writers
speak of a
'driving
into the unconsciousness'
or 'organic
repression.'
These un-Ca r tesian terms force us to form the idea of an
organic thought through which the relation
the 'psychic'
to the 'phy s iological'
becomes conceivable.

2f

The phenomenon of the phantom limb makes clear
the human body when one is discussing
It

is not altogether

among other

like

objects.

a mental

entity

a unique

one,

other

it

as an object

objects,

it

it

as it

functions

as a living,

an object

is not exclusively

So, the human body is in fact

in so far

of

in the world.

is not simply

However, as we saw above,

either.

the uniqueness

an object,
relational

but
axis

for human experience.
It is by abandoning the body as an object partes extra
partes,
and going back to the body which I experience
at
this moment, in the manner, for example, in which my hand
moves round the object it touches,
anticipating
the stimuli
and itself
tracing
out the form which I am about to
perceive.
I cannot understand
the function
of the living
body except by enacting
it myself, and ex §Pt in so far as
2
lam a body which rises toward the world.
The relationship

between

the psychical

and the physiological

the human body is more complex than one might
Traditionally
regarded

the relationship

quite

is not soul

mechanistically

and vice

versa.

of the soul
or quite

think

in

initially.

to the body has been

dualistically;

what is body

As Zaner notes:

Once one accepts such a dualism, he is faced with the
insoluble
problem of reestablishing
the principle
of
connection
between these two essentially
different
substances,_and
ge must either
reduce mind to matter,
or
2
matter to mind.
As a result

of this

separation

the functions

of each dimension

of

20
human experience
respect

have been separated

to knowledge,

ignored,

the role

with mechanist&

knowledge

the very possibility

these

case,

with

of knowledge as

of a complex machine and dualist&

to the mind as separate

epistemology

In either

ot the body has been essentially

denying

more than the conditioning

as well.

from the body.

limiting

In Merleau-Ponty's

views of the human body are both rejected.

Man taken as a concrete being is not a psyche joined to an
organism, but the movement to and fro of existence
which at
one time allows itself
to take corporeal
form and at others
moves towards personal acts ••• The union of soul and body _
is not an amalgamation between two mutually external
t~ ms,
0
subject and object,
brought about by arbitrary
decree.
In his

last

Merleau-Ponty
following

and unfinished

refers

Visible~.!.!!!_

work,~

to the relationship

Invisible,

between mind and body in the

way:

Define the mind as the other side of the body - we have
no idea of a mind that would not be doubled with a body,
that would not be established
on this ground - The 'other'
side means that the body ••• is not describable
in
objective
terms, in terms of the in-itself
- that this
other side is really
the other side of the body, overflows
into it (Uberschreiten),
encroaches upon it, is hidden in
it - at the same time needs it, terminates
in it, is
anchored in it • .j 1
It

is clear

an object

like

that
other

in the thou~ht
objects

in the world.

between

the mind and the body,

thought

of Descartes,

dimensionality.
the other
poles

of a magnetic

the other.

Because

can never be thought
world.

field;

the body is not

the relationship

of separation

but is rather

The one dimension
manner.

Also,

is not that

for example,

in an organic

of Merleau-Ponty

is inextricably

as in the

a relationship
intertwined

The mind and the body are like

each gets

its

the body can never
of as an object

reality

exist

apart

among other

and identity

of
within
two
from

from the mind,
objects

in the

it

I

I'

'

'

~l

I

\!/ ~heolher.~Je oI L.1f"'nl !LalIle lol; ~. nol..erell
another

object

in the world is that

person experiences
and/or

objects

is crucial

study,

his or her own body differently

in the world.

This uniqueness

to an understanding

and the known.

Moreover, as will

be pointed

between the knower

out later

on in this

as embodied subjects

what are the aspects

relationship

bodies

of the body as subject

is for

the paradigm case for knowing in general.

by examining a person's

Each

from other

of the relationship

our knowledge of ourselves

Merleau-Ponty

of the body as subject.

to their

Let us begin

own body more closely;

that make it unique and so very important

epistemologically?
First

of all,

is a certain
it:

one can never get away from one's

kind of permanence of my body.

"The body is therefore

has the particularity
present.
foundation

Its

not as any other

permanency 1s absolute

for the relative
object

body, thus it is questionable
at all.

In fact,

says this

object,

of being always available

away from every other

"object"

Barral

own body.

in the entire
whether one's

world,

about

but one which

to me - always

inasmuch as it serves

permanence of objects.

There

as a

1132 I can walk
but not from my own

own body can be called

"walking away" entails

a body in/w i th

an

oneself

or in front

of oneself

to look at one's

angle.

We normally

experience

ourselves,

vectorially

or from the "inside

A dualist

might object

back" from oneself

quite

behaving or thinking

so-called

"self-transcendence"

it fails

which is performing

that

designated

independently

on the unity

of the other,

self,

of

of the
not just

even when one is

here is similar

pole of a magnetic

field

to that

of

can be

each can exist

apart

from the

from the truth.

the body is the axis

from which I experience

The permanence of my body "is not a permanence in the

.
b ut a permanence f rom my point

l
word,

even such acts

It is the full

The mistake

Nothing could be further
For Merleau-Ponty

The problem with this

are predicated

since either

one "steps

as when we observe ourselves

to acknowledge that

in self-reflection.

bodies.

and s_ay that

and engages the world,

concluding

other

point

these acts.

the mind, which intends

other.

as well as the world,

about our own thoughts.

is that

involved

at this

from a fresh

as it were.

frequently,

objection

self

out,"

self

.
..34
o f view.

I cannot have more

than one point of view at any one moment because my kinaesthetic
perspective
dependent

stems from my position
on where my body is,

is always the vantage
world.

where I am.

This perspective

from which l experience

to do with

what

a double sensation,

of the uniqueness
Merleau-Ponty

calls

is

My body, in other words,
others

"Here" is always where my body is and I am always

Another aspect
has

point

in the world.

of my experience
"double

"here."

of my own body

sensations."

for example, when l touch myself.

and the

I have

When l press
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at the same time both of my hands are subjects
touching.

Each hand is at once both touching

(The same can perhaps
in a mirror,
be said

and objects

be said about seeing

or when looking

to be seeing

Merleau-Ponty

puts

into

of

and being touched.

if I am looking

the eyes of another

at myself

person.

and to be seen si~ultaneously.)

I can

This is now

it:

When I press my two hands together,
it is not a matter
of two sensations
felt together as one perceives two
objects placed side by side, but of an ambiguous set - up
in which both hands can alternate
the roles of 'touching'
and being 'touched'
••• I can identify
the hand tou~ged
as the same one which will in a moment be touching.
I think Merleau-Ponty's
that

language

the "hands ••• alternate
111

'touched.

It

seems to me that,

of my attention
the object,

neither

with others.

although

of touching,

since

another

This is precisely

human body cannot

be most helpful

the subject

to the object

Next, my body is said
external

things

is that

means that my head hurts,

in the world,

lhis

point

and
the

along

to Merleau-Ponty,

a

is the very point
perhaps

it would

to stress

ourselves,

the

. without

or vice versa.
object,

whereas

of view merely represented."

if I, for example,

without

were possible

Therefore,

to be "an affective

are from my point

What is meant by this

were, of my pain.

object

of the act of touching

being

become the subject

if this

for the making of an overall

the focus

and the other

be and remain a human body.

character

and being

I can alternate

what, according

of the phenomenon of double sensation.

reducing

of 'touching'

one of them can absolutely

hand would become just

simutlaneous

too loose when he says

from one hand being the subject

cease being the object
"object"

the roles

is a bit

36

have a headache , it

my head being the cause,

as it

24
Fot if I say that my foot hurts, I do not simply mean that
it is a cause of pain in the same way as the nail, which
is cu~~ing into it, differing
only in being nearer to
me •••

Having a pain in my head or my foot could be explained
to the foregoing
similar
time,

discussion

of double

way as my hands are touching
when they are touching

affecting

unique

has to do with what are called

the sense of movement.
other
it

things

by means of something

both the subject
on this

of my han d i t self,
one .

I raise

of my movement.

I can distinguish

sense,"

1..e.

I do not raise

is at the same time
If I move this

pen

the obj ect of movement,

of movement, me, because

they are separate

with respect

to the movement

Thi s is ' not possible

be cause here the subject

say that

of movement, but it

This

from how I move

my arm directly,

and the object

One coul d perhaps

object

to as the "sixth

My body, again,

however,

11

"k.ioaesthe ·t ic sensations.

el s e.

the pen, from the subject

is

my body as subject

I move my body aifferently

paper with my hand,

from each other.

also my head or foot

of experiencing

be referred

with my body.

at the same

by pain at the same time.

characteristic

phenomenon could perhaps

it

In a somewhat

and being touched

each other,

pain and is affected

A final

sensations.

by relating

still

in this

latter

makes sense

and object

instance
t o say that

there

are
is no

my han d is

moving.
I move external
objects with the aid of my boay, which
takes hold of them in one place and shif t s them to another.
But my body itself
I move directly,
I do not find it at one
point of objective
space and transfe r i t to another, I have
no need to look for it, it is alr e aa y ,wi t h me -- I do not
need to lead it towards the movement' s complet i on, it is in
contact with it from the start and pr ope l s i tself towards
an en<i. l'he relation~hip
bet~gen my decisi on and my body
are, in movement, magic ones.
As these

four above characteristics

illust

r ate,

my experience

of

25
my body is quite

different

from my experience

of other

bodies.

permanence of my body, the phenomenon of double sensations,
an affective
that

object,

and kinaesthetic

my relationship

argue that

this

relationship

is so different

it should not be called

in a relationship
necessary,

to my own body is unique.

relationship

that

sensations

commonly so called,

my body as

make it

In fact,

clear

one might

from any other
a relationship

at least

but I and my body are really

all

The

at all.

two entities

For

are

only one, and significantly

so.

(3)
Ponty's

Let us now move on to the third
philosophy

of the body and its

the knower to the known.
one's

own body, to its

body is clearly

This aspect

locality

different

major aspect

bearing
pertains

on the relationship
to the spatiality

or "-whereness."

from that

ot Merleau-

of any other

of
of

The "-where" of my
thing

in the world.

If my arm is resting on the table I should never think
of saying that it is beside the ashtray ~n the same way
as the ashtray is beside the telephone. 3
The image one gets

from the expression

is one of an artificial
location

of a real,

arm , an object
organic

speak.

to one's

possession

each of my limbs is through
This body image may include,
limit,

objects.

indeed cannot,

the ashtray"
The
be given

in

knows where his or her arm is in

own body, to oneself,

"I am in undivided

from the "inside,"

so to

of [my body] and I know where

a body image in which a ll are included.
in addition

location

of one's

present,

as we have seen above.

body image:

among other

arm need not,

the above way, be cau s e a person
relation

"My ai:·m is beside

an awareness

to an awar ene s s of the

of a limb which is no longer

1'his is what Bannan says about the

1140
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Merleau-Ponty demonstrated
that the parts of' the body
are not simply "outside of parts" as the traditional
definition
of objective
apace would have it, but that
they mutually imply each other because of their
integration
in a single form. Because of such a form,
which Merleau-Ponty now refers to as body image, I have
an undivided possessi~y
of the parts of my body, for the
image envelopes them.
The unique
by referring
thing

spatiality

once again

as an objective

location
entire

of one's

to the concept

"here;"

of my body defines
existence

own body can perhaps
of

11

11

here.

be clarified

There 1.s no such

here is always where I am.
where "here"

is,

it

The

is the axis

of my

and experience.

The world 'here'
applied to my body does not refer to a
determinate
position
in relation
to other positions
or
to uternal
co-ordinates,
the anchoring of the active
body in an o~Ject, the situation
of the body in the face
of its task.
In other

words,

with respect

1.s not an objective,

abstract

space 1.s essentially

relational

The "here"

other

subject ••• Just

as lam

being objects,

of space."

point,

1.n tact

so also

it

is from this

becomes real

space

most objective

of all

in space ••• due to the body as

not an object

because

I am the condition

I am not in space because

for ~

I am the source

space,
hand,

I

!

(

,,..,,,,,,
speaks

- notion
.
.
f oun d cttion
o f the

other

Also,

the body.
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Merleau-Ponty

bodily

and is known in and through
to me.

space

On the contrary,

" ••• the body has that

- deployment

of the world,

or concept.

spac e becomes meaningful,

As Bannan notes:

characteristics

there

reality

is a space only in relation

"h e re" that
at all.

to my experience

it

structure

·
an d rea 1 1.ty
ot· space. ,,44

is the here where my body is.

is external

the here,

of the "point-horizon"

space,

is wherever

The point

is my

The hor i zon, on the

which circumscribes
I stand

as the

and the horizon

the point.

The

is the limit

of
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my vision
spatial
also

and my movement.
world.

The point

Furthermore,

moves the horizon.

as I move and thus

l'herefore,

then make up _my

the point

I can never

can never get to wnere the horizon
once again

and the horizon

moves, so

le~ve my "here"

and

was, it has moved away and I am

at my point.

It is difficult

to talk

same time about motility,
This is especially

about

spatiality

as the above discussion

significant

the inherent

and hence all

of our knowledge as well.

as we move.

relationality

that

talking

clearly

for the subject-object

it underlines

(4) It . is in space

without

at the

illustrates.

dichotomy,

of our embodieo existence,

we move, and space becomes space

As Merleau-Ponty

since

for us

says:

It is clearly
in action that the spatiality
of our body is
brought into being, and an analysis
of one's own movement
should enable us to arrive at a better understanding
of it.
By considering
the body in movement, we can see better how
it inhabits
space ••• because movement is not limited to
/\'h,li -t
submitting
passively
to space and time, it actively
assures
them, it tak e s them up in their basic significance,
which
i~ obs~ured ~n the commonplaces of establishing
s1.tuat1.ons. 4
Let us then examine the notion
Merleau-Ponty's

philosophy

there

are:

concrete

these

two movements correspond

discussed

are two types

movement and abstract

above.

Concrete

of motility

in more detail.
of movements.

movement.

to the two types

movement takes

abstract

movement happens

in external,

Clearly,

for Merleau-Ponty,

the latter

place

or perhaps

To a large

In
These

degree

of space which were
1.n bodily

space,

objective

emerges or is derived

while

space.
from the

former.
,,,,,,.,,...--Schneider,
· l
goo d dea,
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a psychiatric
. a person
1.s

patient

to whom Merleau-Ponty

wh o can on l y per f orm concrete

refers

.
movements 10

a

28
bodily

space.

a part

of his body, with his eyes shut.

"psychic

He can make no abstract

blindness."

thus he cannot
,

For Schneider

in any way think

His body tor him is pure subject.

---

itch

on some part

of his

however,

movements,

His condition

there

It,

itching,

he could not do so.

Pointing

in abstract

in the world.

if Schneider

it and scratch

he were askeo to point

his body as an object

space and

of his body as an object
For instance,

it

gets

an

quite

to the spot where he was

would necessitate

space.

to

is called

is no objective

body, he can find

easily.

such as pointing

experiencing

Schneider

does not need to look for the place where he has been stung.
He finds it straightway,
because for him there is no
question of locating
it in relation
to axes of co-ordinates
in objective
space, but of reaching with his phenomenal hand
a certain
painful spot of bis phenomenal body, and because
between the hand as a scratching
potentiality
and the place
stung as a spot to be scratched
a directly
experienced
relationship
is presented
in the natural
system of one's own
body.
The whole operation
takes place in the domain of t~1
phenomenal;
it does not run through the objective
world.
It

is possible

difficulty
exercise

for us normal people,

of regarding
will

your boay so that
friend

to point

finger

is not difficult

subject

Greifen

of you, cross

Now, pull

your fingers.

touch the finger,

you will

is possible

If,
that

to

then ask a
it.

however,

Now try
your

moving the proper

at all.

space,

(greifen)

touching

to.

find

your hands close

fingers.

without

or anyone who can only think

in bodily

and grasping

Extend your arms in front

which has been pointed

will

Schneider,

the following

to one of your fingers

friend

the

Perhaps

you can see your interlac~d

to move the finger

to experience

our body as an object.

prove helpful:

them, and then interlace

too,

can only perform
and no abstract

for Schneider

of themselves

concrete

tasks

tasks

of pointing

not only through

as a

of touching
(zeigen).

his own body, but
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also

with respect

objects

to other

are tools

in relation

........

.,,.

-

--

,,..

Schneider

an abstract

for instance,

uescription

study

of Schneider

concrete
.._

movement
-·----~
-

humaE_ ~_yerience

and,

movement and bodily

--

abstract

and not ~omething

is only relevant

it

in

for

sharpness,

in the former,

therefore,

since

is not true,

in and of

and shape.

draws the conclusion
··
----·----..........~

space enjoy a privileged
also

position

in human knowing.

mov_e
~ent and the experience

but the reverse

width,

Merleau-Ponty

and bodily

perhaps,

Re would not

to eat with.

space are seen as primordial

put it more helpfully,
grounded

tasks

other

of a fork as an object

where one might examine its
From this

that

A fork,

For him, all

~¥

when be is hungry and uses

understand
itself,

.. ___.

as well.

to concrete

-- --- ---

and of themselves.
----

objects

in

Concrete

and out of them grow

of external,

for Merleau-Ponty

-

-- -------·

objective

s~a~e.

the latter

they could not be without
as the case of Schneider

To

are

the former,
makes clear.

The light is thus thrown upon the distinction
between
abstract
and concrete movement: th ~_~ackground to concrete
mov_!:!Dent_ is the world as given, whereas the background to
abstract
movement is built up ••• Concrete movement is
th ere fore centripetal
whereas abstract
movement is
centrifugal.
The former occurs in the realm of being or of
the actual,
the latter
on the other hand in that of the
possible
or non-existent;
the first
adheres to a giv:g
background,
the second throws out its own background.
This concrete
1.s unoerstood
(as this

movement, then,

tacitly,

whereas

seems to be tactile

abstract

word is traditionally

understood)

or propositional

more explicitly.

concrete,

knowledge has been ignored

articulated;

In traditional

it has been assumeo that

one knows, i.e.

explicating

Thus, abstract,

propositional

exhaustively
knowing,

and

movement is more "cognitive"

and is understood
tactile

in quality

because

epistemology,
it cannot

knowledge requires
the reasons
on the other

in quality

be

knowing that

why one knows.
hand,

has been
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taken as the only relevant

factor

crucial

philosophy

in Merleau-Ponty's

shitting

the axis

~--.--

knowledge

(the

concrete).

of epistemology

abstract)

limited

and towards

to mental

fundamental,

bodily

from the second-order

me as

he is

movement and

or primordial

our attention

level

(the

away from the propositional

the embodied.

operations,

What strikes

of the body is that

to the first-order

lie is directing

or conceptual

in epistemology.

He claims

but also

includes,

that

knowing is not

indeed

requires

as

knowing.

Beneath intelligence
as beneath perception
we discover a
more fundamental function,
a vector mobile in all directions
like a searchlight,
one through which we can direct
ourselves
towards anything,
in or outside ourselves,
a~~
display a form of behavior in relation
to that object.
This fundamental
of desire
about

which anchors

life,

is an intentional

or perceptual

the unity

of the senses,

·
1150 To use,
moti· 1 ity.

contemporary
. ...

~

as a body in space,

(greifen)
meaning,

and taking

intentional
that

activity

getting

sticking

out its

to be able

to experiential

clear

is not arbitrary,

tongue.

to distin&uisb

calls

for

knowledge).
space,

is as an embodied being

even a ten day old baby will

among

~ ·~,_...-;..,_Jo,,,
-- ..... -""""

hold of things;

first

and

distinction

philosophy

Even a newly born baby comes into

without

which brings

of sensibility

or as a body which inhabits
It

the life

on knowing how (propositional

in relation

the world.

find meaning.

life,

•

knowledge as derivative

and encounter

arch,

a familiar

Merleau-Ponty's

to be seen as parasitic

~

"cognitive

of intelligence,

and to transform,

epistemologists,

knowing that
~...k.e

function

it

human faces

that

its

It

we intend
~e seek and

concepts.

and intending
This

as can be seen from the fact
a smile

and the act of

new born infants
from other

is

the world grasping

comes expecting

about

imitate

Moreover,

that

....

have been shown

figures

and their
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~

mother's

face

It
zeigen,

from other

is through

movement in space

- -~---·
that

faces.
then,

1

first

greifen

and then

we seek and find meaning in the world.

Already motility,
in its pure state,
possesses
the basic
Even if
power of giving a meaning (Sinngebung).
subsequently
thought and the perception
of space are freed
from motility
and spatial
being 1 for us to be able to
conceive space 1 it is in the first
place necessary
that we
should have been thrust into it by our body, and that it
should have provided us with the first model of those
transpositions.
equivalents
and identifications
which make
space into an objective
system and allow Qu experience
to
be one of objects,
opening out on 'itself.'
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I mentioned
places

bodily

intellectual

earlier

that

Merleau-Ponty's

knowing at the center
or conceptual

knowing.

he means by knowing with one's
the difficulty

ot driving

transmission
for example

of all

that

including

1

own body.

you are now operating

person

walks down a street

a car without

foot.

her stick

a clutch

to guide

even a mental
Also
her

not a mere object

in her hand but has become an extension

has become a part

of her body.

stick

that

was longer

come to know its
it

than the one she usually

different

to poke and touch things

using

it

in the world,

If the blind

length
with.

by measuring

person
used,
it,

--

1

when a blind

1

the stick

. __

is

·-

....._

of her body,

were to pick up a
she would not
etc.,

She would indwell

and the world through

and to

Your knowledge of bow

you to overcome it.

using

type of

It is so easy to forget,

your own car is so much in your body that
does not always enable

at what

Most of us have experienced

a car which has a different

eftort

of the body

Let us look more closely

push down the brake pedal with your left
to drive

knowing

from the one we are used to.
1

philosophy

but by using

the stick

by

the stick.
/

In the same ~ay 1 a dancer
does not first

learn

a formula

learns

to dance a particular

for tne dance,

but rather

dance.
be starts

be
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dancing.

lie begins

the dance.
musical
about

to move his . body and slowly

This same pattern

instrument.
to perform

holds

true

When, for example,
on an unfamiliar

his

for those

body comes to know
learning

an experienced

instrument

to play a

organist

is

with only a short

time in

which to practice,
Are we to maintain that the organist
analyzes the organ,
that he conjures up and retains
a representation
of the
stops,
pedals and manuals and their relation
to each other
in space?
But during the short rehearsals
preceding the
concert,
he does not act like a person about to draw up a
plan.
He sits on the seat, works the pedals, pulls out the
stops, gets the measure of the instrument
with his body,
incorporates
within himself the relevant
directions
and
dimens!2ns,
settles
into the organ as one settles
into a
house.
In the above examples
expressive

space has come to the fore.

bodily

space

bodily

space,

mute,

that

static,

through

--

of knowing one's

intentions

or natural

It

and meanings

where concrete

body,

the booy as

is in and through
are expressed.

movements are performed,

as is objective

space.

this

Therefore,

~J f T

is not empty,

Rather,

it

is that

which meaning arises.
The boay is our general medium for having a world ••• We say
that the body has understood and habit has been cultivated
when it has absorbed a new meaning, and assimilated
a fresh
core of significance
••• Bodily experience
forces us to
acknowleage an imposition
of meaning which is not the work
of a universal
constituting
consciousness,
a meaning which
clings to certain
contents.
My body is that meaningful core
which behaves like a general function,
and which .
t'o disease. 53
nevertheless
exists,
and is susceptible

This discussion

of the motility

in our knowledge of the world,
for the subject-object
section
(5)

of this

dichotomy

of the body, and of its
carries

with it

which shall

crucial

important

be taken

role

implications

up in the final

paper.

The final

to our examination

J>Oint of Merleau-Ponty's
of its

relevance

philosophy

for . the relation

which pertains

between

the
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knower and the known bas to do with his concept
our own body.

First

being of one's

body are not two different

separable

of all,

in experience,

but are,

one reality.

Space,

space,

than merely

rather

we consider

for us,

a person

i t as an external
may refuse

the spatiality

to accept

her.

comprise

them as subject,
in external

while

space.

woman's bodily
one's

parts

being,

reflective

her bodily

body or part

of

it

which

as part

of

space and she experiences

arm is experienced

the arm in question

as an object

is not part

of her b~ing.

and the space of one's

they may perhaps

analysis,

their

whose arm has been mutilated

space and thus is not part

with each other;

of

when

She knows where the "thing"

the malformed

self,

becomes clear

but she does not experience

In short,

one's

or dimensions

and -the body is of

This difference

it as her arm.
is,

They are not

1.n being,

regards

of

own body and the

two aspects

Thus a person

hangs from her shoulder
lier healthy

things.

is rooted

who, for example,

object.

of one's

rather,

in it.

of the synthesis

Therefore,

body are 1.n synthesis

be distinguished

such as in the present

of the

from each other

case,

in

but not in normal

experience.
ln one's
spatiality,
One's

body, with respect
there

is,

body is unlike

according

with each other.

dimensions,

are in much greater

are,

The different

as it were,

aspects

of it

to Merleau-Ponty,

a machine where different

co-ordinated

machine.

to all

The various
organic

dimensions

"superimposed"

a unique
parts

bod ily

unity

and not only its
synthesis.

are simply

parts,

or better,

than are the parts

of a human body and their

upon each other,

of a

function

they interpenetrate

each other.
l'he connecting
link between the parts of our body and that
between our visual and tactile
experience
are not forged
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gradually
and cumulatively.
I do not translate
the 'data of
touch' into the 'language of seeing'
or vice versa - I do
not bring together one by one the parts of my body;
this
transaction
and this unification
are per§grmed once and for
all within me: they are my body itself.
The unity
art

and synthesis

provides

an excellent

human body.

of the different

dimensions

model for understanding

that

in a work of
of a living

As Bannan states:

In an attempt to characterize
the body more globally
Merleau-Ponty
seeks an expression
that will signify
it in
its synthesis
with consciousness.
The unity of this
synthesis
is much too variable,
subtle and flexible
to be
conveyed by any classic
or otherwise established
formulation.
Merleau-Ponty
proposes an analogy with another
reality
whose unity is highly mys;~rious but nonetheless
unquestionable:
the work of a r t.
That which unites
instance,
gets

the various

is not itself

its

reality
get

their

of it.

So, too,

an identifiable

significance

-

means of the synthesis
of a painting

meaning cannot

apart

be reduced

As -Merleau-Ponty

said:

cannot

Questions

be stated

own master.
like:

reality

except

be talked

summary of those
to transmit

an

the artist

which receives

or

neither
it

is
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11

Where is the meaning in the painting?,"

you put the meaning into

up, this

particulars.

by the work itself:

it nor the thought
11

The meaning

which make it

begins

the

and meaning by

it cannot

But the meaning of the work for

which created
its

comprising

.

from the particulars
to an analytic

by means

moving body.

and although

"The work ot art

message.

for the public

completely

which is the living,

is in tne painting,

about or experienced

their

which

They,

and are synthesized

obtain

for

entity

from the parts.

from it,

of human beings

a painting,

or objectifiable

and even more so, do the dimensions

embodied existence

uninterrupted

s comprising

and meaning exclusively

rather,

the thought

particular

the painting

yet?,"

and "Can you paint

"Have
the
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painting

without

the meaning? are,

meaning of a painting,

like

its

needless

to say,

harmony, vigor,

without

colors,

lines,

mediate

its

little

being

etc.

and all

glance. 1157 In like

manner,

as a "tablecloth

Cezanne,

paint
that

"crowned"

58

of a painting

embody it.

One cannot

discerns

in it.

amidst

constitutes

their

If I paint

the various
unity.

that

be detached

itself;
1his

that

parts
lie puts

all

the

and convey his
a scene described
snow, upon

"Now I know

I've

the meaning,

the

had it,

from the particulars

and functions

to

rising

individual

of synthesis

this

they

I paint

fashion:

they become parts

it

that

'crowned'

of this

is the sort

shapes,

he would be able

the place-settings

have the parts

trom the painting

participating

cannot

its

crowned with bread

his doubt in this

Cezanne understood

and tension,

of newly fallen

symmetrically,

only to paint

expression

apart

as a layer

and the bread rolls.

you understand?"

to paint

was not confident

and expressed

one must will

symmetrically

arise

"If

I capture

Cezanne sought
white

however,

in the painting

maroons,

The

The particular

As Cezanne put it:

the little

which the place-settings
rolls."

to them.

are so synthesized

meaning to us.

blues

by Balzac

reducible

sadness,

i,!! and through

is embodied in the work and is experienced
particulars

bizarre.

which

painting

of this

painting

that

~erleau-Ponty

ot the human body.

~ay:

A novel, poem, picture,
or musical work are inaividuals,
that is, beings in whic h the expression
is indistinguishable
from the thing expre s se d, their meaning, accessible
only
through direct contact,
being mediated with no change of
their temporal and spatial
situation.
It is in this sense
our body is comparable to a work of art.
It is a nexus of
living meanings, not the §unction of a certain
number of
mutually variable
terms. 5
·
Now, let
order

me summarize the foregoing

points

presented

above in

to show how they bea r on the problem of the knower and the

by

It
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known.

Let us take the five points

contribute

as outlined

to overcoming the epistemic

and see how they might

gap between the subject

and the

object.

We do not experience
objects

in the world,

our own body as an object

unless

a part

of it is rejected

or another.

In a normal situation

we do ~ot,

experience

our own body as an object

partes

words, a mechanistic
nor possible,

contexts

our own bodies
bodies.

understanding

quite

We experience

simultaneously,
pa in-giver

and that

demonstrates

as medical

that

that,

in talking

partes,

a point

except

in

other

and object,
pain in our foot,

or and understanding

we see that

My body is an object

provides

helpful

We experience

the

\

we know our own body because we~

between the knowing subject

one.

etc.

when we feel

aistinction

disembodied

In other

from the way we experience

object

extra

partes.

existence,

diagnosis,

subject~

partes

we cannot,

which is in pain are one and the same,

~ubsequently,

apply.

extra

them as both subject

and the fact

in fact

of our bodily

differently

for one reason

of our own body is neither

given the realities

such specialized

among other

the traditional

our body as both

epistemological

and the known object

in the world in some sense,

and my body is a subject

The body, then,
of departure

our body.

also,

approach

but not as

but not a

and our understanding

for a fresh

does not

of it,

to the relationship

between the knower and the known.
The spatiality
that
bodily

of other
space,

things.

of one's

own body, too,

The parts

is qui t e different

of my body are incorporated

which is not abstract,

mute, or neutral,

from
into my

but which makes

37
up my very way of being in the world and my body image.
Merleau-Ponty's

philosophy

of the body, has lost

character

and has become relational

the table

is not a neutral

of mine in front
coffee.

relationality

distance

constitutes

ourselves

between the subject

in our bodies

from which all

achievement

initial

prefers

space leaves

cup on

is a cup
I drank my

no room for
for it

expresses

our relationality

bodily

movement is our

at meaning and knowledge

departure.

the phrase,

with

It is for this

'I can,'

reason
11

to Descartes'

that

1 think,

1 am. 1160

therefore

It is as moving bodies
embodied and moving that
our body parts
possibility

we accomplish

of overcoming

knowing.

understood

of space that

and tunctions

knowledge of ourselves
for all

but it

and the object,

Concrete

our efforts

make their

Merleau-Ponty

space,

this

to each other.

also

and with the world.

foothold

of bodily

the two in relation

Motility

For example,

in abstract

in

"objecti ve"

of me in our camper and from which earlier

The basic

epistemic

object

instead.

its

Space,

we move in space;

knowledge.

to each other

as inherently

if the

is to serve as the paradigm

and functions

and integrally

of

to the

dichotomy

as embodied beings

The parts

The relationship

is crucial

the subject-object

t is as

of our body must be
one in order

for the epistemic

gap to be eliminated.
The maJor point
of parts

here

18

which are related

does not exist
and with itself
as by virtue

in abstract
in its
of its

that

to each other

objectively

space,

in inextricable

own space,

motility.

the human body, in not being made up

but

l.S

and with its

Furthermore,

or externally,
relation

surr oundin gs

other

bodies

to

s well

and persons

38
ao not exist

"out there"

of the epistemig

as objects

gap, but they exist

as I and they interact

might be more clearly

and objects

again as two poles

talked
apart

and negative

poles

when one ceases
about separately,
from each other.

Ponty is saying

that

in a common electromagnetic

to exist,

so also

does the other.

to think

lS

a knower only in relation

known is the known only in relati
significance

from the other.

exist

to that

of subjects
field.

They can be

nor be experienced
Merleau-

the relationship
in character.

The

which is lmollln; and the

on to a knower.

The

from each

seems to me that

about

between the knower and the known as symbiotic
knower

and identity

but they can neither

space.

This

if one thinks

reality

side

to me and each other

reciprocally.

understood

get their

is best

on the far

in common, relational

In the same way, it
it

space,

relation

from each other

reciprocity

other;

10

with one another

~e gain our individuality

positive

in abstract

Both get their

39

3. A Philosophy

In the previous
expresses

section

our intentions

is,

of course,

can,

according

linguistic

behavior.

to Merleau-Ponty,

the traditional

of this

present

Ponty's

philosophy

link.

of language

experience:

how Merleau-Ponty

to understand

present

stuay

' s philosophy

and the body.
of l anguage will

resolutio

n of the problem of the epistemic

is quite

direct

He says:

th e opportunity

to leave

Row are language
according

from language.
significance
thought

with words.
existing

three

this

connecting

dimensions

to

of

Let us now see if and
contribute

to the

Merlea u-Po nt y himself
to describe

act of meaning,

behind us, once and for all,

and thought

related

the

we shall

ha ve

the traditional

to Merleau-Ponty;

to each other?
there

Language is the incarnation
apart

is said

In such views

on Merleau-

d 1c
' h otomy. 61

.
b Ject
'
su bJect-o

intimately,

gap.

"In trying

phenomenon of speech and the specific

is the focus

it may prove helpful

to the following

the world,

that

to have a handle

in order

of this

link

as a way of

dichotomy

It is essential

about it.

activity

be viewed as a connecting

of language

thought,

activity

Language as a bodily

and the known object,

in relation

activity

One form of bodily

yet problematic

thesis.

For the purposes

think

we have seen how bodily

and meanings.

between the knowing subject
overcoming

of Language

from the other.

to exist

before,

Merleau-Ponty

for itself,

of thought

and thus independently

disagrees

independently

is no thought

In some theories

one can have thoughts

without

Very
apart

and ne~ther

has

of language,
of,

speech.

words as well as thoughts

and says:

"A thought

of the constraints

limited

of speech and

to

40
communication,
unconscious,

would no sooner
which means that

We do not first

have a · concept

appear

than it would sink

it would not exist,

into

the
1162

even for itself.

in our mind and then put it

into

words.

When i fix my eyes on an object in the half-light,
and say:
'It is a brush,'
there is not in my mind the concept of a
brush, under which i subsume the object and which moreover
with the word 'brush,'
but
is linked by frequent association
the word bears the meaning, and by imposing it g~ the
object,
i am conscious of reaching that object.
l'hus Merleau-Ponty
made thought,
then,

but accomplishes

is not distinct

meaning.
prior

says that

from the words,

for the words embody the

one does not have meaning prior

Thought and meaning are embodied,
similar

to the way a glance
of a portrait

Merleau-Ponty's

ready-

it. 1164 The meaning of a sentence,

In the same way as one does not have pre-existing

to language,

colors

"speech ••• does not translate

incarnated

was said

painting.

thoughts

to language.

in language

in a way

by Cezanne to be embodied in the

Rere is what Sallis

view of the relationship

between

says about

thought

and speech:

An idea ••• comes into my possession
only by means of an act
of expression
in which I make it dwell in my language:
'I
say that a signification
is acquired and henceforth
available
when I have succeeded in making it dwell in a
speech apparatus.'
(Signs, 91).
Thought terminates
in
speech; 'one g3es not know what one says, one knows after
having said. '
Interestingly
quotation

enough,

the passage

shows that

1960, when he wrote

Merleau-Pooty

that

Sallis

agreed

saying

to speak as if the meaning of an utterance

from the utterance.
think

with this

before

thought."

6ti

in the above
point

as late

as

Signs.

If one only knows ~hat one says after
sense

quotes

speaking,

Merleau-Ponty

remarks:

nor even while

Even now as I am writing

it makes no

could be known apart

"The orator

speaking;
these

it,

his

sentences,

doe s not

speech

is his

I do not have

41
wordless

thoughts

thoughts

about

are opening

way with speech;

circumstances

to what I am writing.

up onto the paper.!!_

it

of what the last

and prior

is possible

I write.

to begin

word of the sentence

we work our thoughts

My
It is the same

a sent .ence without

will

be.

any idea

Under normal

out as we go •

••• speech is not the 'sign'
of thought, if by this we
understand
a phenomenon which heralds another as smoke
betrays fire.
Speech and thought would admit of this .
external
relation
only if they were both thematically
given,
whereas in fact they are intervolved,
the sense being held
within the wo
6 and the word being the external existence
of the sense.

1,

This integral
meaning,

relationship

is similar

piece.

without

to that

the notes

between

of course,

themselves.

there

musical

in written

In other

piece;

if

is in reality

says:

11

inner

a silent

between

that

language

so-called
univocal

"picture
signs

normal person
using

with

we have some iaea

relationship
between

- 69
them."

with

notes
mind as a

and melody then it

language

words,

musical

1n one's

and thought,

form of the former.

is alive

is impossible

the

As *erleau-Ponty

this

inner

life · is an

68

language."
Now that

but in the actual

a song can only exist

Similarly

lhis ••• silence

It

embodying the hum in notes;

is not embodied in notes

simply does not exist.
latter

symbols,

or

in a musical

would be no music.
without

words,

it

and thought,

between melody and notes

even to hum a melody silently
not,

language

language

or labels

Further

and thought,

and the world.

theory"

possesses

of how Merleau-Ponty
let

First

understands

the

us see how he treats

ot all,

he rejects

the

of lan&uage in which words are regarded
for states

of affairs.

1s not a stock

of words,

on he continues:

lie says:

'

"what the

but a certain

"And as,

as

in a foreign

way of

42
country,
place

I begin

to understand

in a context

l 1. f e...

.. 70

the meaning of words through

of action,

and by taking

The use of words,

Merleau-Ponty

would agree

they maintain

that

then,

in a communal

part

is the key notion

with ordinary

language

meaning is a function

a meaning,

which though relatively

Mallin

as the purposes
puts

philosophy
it

Merleau-Ponty

that

linguistic

full

of words that

pulling

according

exist

there

language

expresses

1s an integral

pa rt icipates

this

changing

it:

thinking,

~a t ur ~lly,

to say that

common knowleage,
learner"

beings

of them."

Yet there

and t hat

for example,

use.

if

1172

which they name,

organic

On the
relationship

goes so far as to claim

to constitute

the world.
manner:

is causi ng it

He

"£'or

to exist

or

by naming them and magic operates

73
things

1n the world ex nihilo

seems to be some sense

our reality

As

have a storage-bag

ve in th.e following

naming an object

we ao not create

means of speech.
proper

Merleau-Ponty

continues

language

whenever need be.

in and helps

God creates

upon the m by speaking

with or d inary

and inextricable

aync1mic constituti

pr e-scientific

stable

of the objects

word-tags

acquire

use evolve. 71

of their

to Merleau-Ponty,

independently

between words and the world.
that

utterances

is to be found in language's

out the appropriate

contrary,

agrees

Through

meaning 1s not self-subsistent,

can be found anywhere it
So one does not,

contexts

and consequences

11

it:

when

of use in context.

overlapping

to shift

here.

philosophers

regul ar usage in cont i nuously
a "sedimentation,"

their

1s linguistically
that

if a child

from a very young age on, she may well

in which it

constituted.
is called
in fact

by
1s
It is

a "slow
become a slow

43
learner,

even though she possesses

an average

ability.

Again,

if a

,·

grown up woman or man is continually
respectively,

they may actually

designations.

behave in ways appropriate

does not pqint

to a reality

it was named, but on the contrary
1174

large

l'herefore,

de~ree

and alters

for certain

thirty

different

linguistic

kinds

style

call

usage.

to such

existing

clear:

for us before

reality

exist

for

the use of language

to a

reality.

a particular

For example,
different

aspect

of reality

Eskimoes have over
kinds

of snow and no

we only have a few words for distinguishing
The Eskimoes'

Thus there

and language,

through

or "boy"

quite

environment

for more names for snow and therefore

between reality
aevelops

that

of snow conditions.

of snow for them.

kinds

our lived

terms for designating

word for snow in general.

life

already

s view,

seems to be the case

calls

point

it makes this

in l'lerleau-Ponty'

creates

It also

different

to as a "girl"

Remy Kwant makes Merleau-Ponty's

"The 'word'

us.

referred

is a symbiotic

they affect

use in relation

there

are more

relationship

each other.

to particular

and

Language

aspects

of the world,

'

lolhile the world is "seen
of lan~uage.
between

lt

language

of all.

It

acquisition
language
helpful

between
as it

study _this

is this
and thus

language

relationship
the origin

grows out of our bodily
at this

stage

In fact,

is clearly

which gives
of speech.
existence.

of our discussion

philosophy.

and the body in Merleau-Ponty's

is intimate.

relationship

as a r e sult

to the relationship

and the body in Merleau-Ponty's

is as important

of the present

as different

is time to turn our attention

The relationship
thought

as" or experiencea

clues

for the purposes

the most important
as to the

For Merleau-Ponty,
For clarity's

to introduce

sake it

is

a distinction
'

l

44
which Merleau-Ponty
two types

makes in the Phenomenology.£!_ Perception

of language .

"language"

child

who names an object

gives

expression

langue).

"speech"

The former

for the first

to an ,original

time,

meaning.

is the "word in the speaking"

where meaning

speech,
their

Language,

it

is the "spoken word."

sedimented

because

"its
76

usage,"

to use Barral's

philosopher,

authentic
original

It

speech
insight

l8

through

formulated

is established

speech.
it

for the
or instituted
according

form of expression

have become stereotyped

grows out of speech.

names an aspect

"foot."

to
·

by

An artist,

has become a sedimented

child,

for the first

such as referring

of everyday,

explains

77

of reality

Through continued

become part

Rere is how Merleau-Ponty

who

form of expression;

is the empirical

by means of a metaphor,

as its

of the

phrase.

language

or scientist

perhaps

a mountain

meanings.

hand,

and the

or of the artist

Language names objects

words and expressions

Furthermore,

time,

on the other

parole),

Both create

or primordial

time.

(la

is the expression

is the authentic

first

then,

(la

One he calls

other

Speech,

75 between

to the base of

use the words of

empirical
expression

the relationship

language.

The

in common usage.
between

speech

and

language:
Languages or constituted
systems of vocabulary and syntax,
empirically
existing
'means of expression'
are both
repository
and residue of acts of speech, in which
unformulated
significance
not only finds the means of being
conveyed outwardly,
but moreover acquires existen5§
for
itself,
and is genuinely created as significance.
Therefore,

the spoken ~ord owes its

ready-made

definition

act of speech
A question

or meaning,

existence,

not to any external,

but to the word in speaking,

itself.
arises,

however:

11

liow does speech as a mode of

to the

45
expression

come to exist?"

introduce
sense,

At this

Merleau-Ponty's

notion

grows out of silence,

silence.

Rather,

In other

words,

or the poet

it
before

person's

posture

meaning.
more,

speak

There

is,

our gestures

then,

and postures

actually

i!!_ the clenched

because

we remember that

angry.

No, for Merleau-Ponty,

communic a tes
a psychic

anger.

fact

hoped to paint,

itself.
inferential

we, too,

concept,

We understand
process,

a

deal

11

of nonverbal
communicates

o f anger,

for

that

fist

in the table

anger

In other

in and is mediated

we are all

in it.

as

lhe

in it

in

which Ceza nne

external

gestures,

is angry

attitude

embodied

setting

is not a separate,

is

.
lf • 1179
1tse

is anger

section.

the

is and

or a threatening
I read

in

when we were

both

is in the gesture,

people's

instance,

a person

our fists

it.

meaning

to Merleau-Ponty,

Anger,

clenched

the gesture,

but because

that

How is this

meaning.

not see anger

but resides
other

meaning

According

as we saw in a previous
gesture

without

body language

the clenched

.
think

"inscape,

communicated

we do not inter

behind

time,

than do the spoken words.

fist.

<10

an original

a great

in our gestures.

was embodied

in a bodily

independent

1

for the first

termed

a person's

of the gesture

the way "crowned"

meaning

11

hidden

The meaning

transmit

embody their

.!!2!_ make~

ges t ure~

names an object

discerned?

gestures

in one

expression.

or truely,

and how is it

Speech,

of gestural

of "body language,"

meaning

to

from the silence

in fact,

and more deeply

as gesture.

the body has already

today

is helpful

and mute

and movements

Sometimes,

it

but not from an unexpressive

what G. !1. Hopkins

speech,

we often

of speech

the child

expresses

each in authentic
words.

springs

juncture

words , t he

and

by the gesture

not by means of an

embodied

beings.

We

46
humans are qualitatively
existence

we stand

Merleau-Ponty's

alike.

Because of our common embodied

in a unique

explanation

relationship

of our ability

to each other.
to understand

Here is
each other's

gestures:
The communication or comprehension of gestures
comes about
through .the reciprocity
of my intentions
and the gestures
of others,
of my gestures
and intentions
discernable
in the
conduct of others.
It is as ifbbhe other person's
intention
inhabited
my body and mine his.
Furthermore,

language,

grows out of bodily

gestures,

grows out of and remains

as t h e gesture

be reduced

whether

in bodily

and it contains

participate

convey.

They, too,

linguistic

etc.

in and mediate
function

meaning in the following

11'.Che spoken

it:

comprising

insignificant

patterns

Even the actual

it,

or

physiological

the sounds comprising

spoken

the meaning which they serve

as bodily

Merleau-Ponty

between such seemingly

Therefore,

meaning in the same way

phonemes and grammatical

meaning in the commonality

existence.

its

puts

of the particulars

by means of which we produce

language

expression.

it

i. t • 1181 Thus the meaning of a lw'ord or gesture

and movements of limbs,

factors

It does so because

As Merleau-Ponty

to an account

they be specific

positions

social

gesture,

contains.

gestural.

which in turn

in the same way as meaning is in the

namely as embodied.

word is a genuine

cannot

remains

grounded

the meaning is in language
gesture,

which grows out of speech,

gestures

which anchor

of our shared

describes

to

physical

and

the interconnections

physical

factors

and linguistic

fashion:

Language, in its turn, presents
no different
a problem:
a
contraction
of the throat,
a sibilant
emission of air
between the tongue and the teeth, a certain
way of bringing
the body into play suddenly allows itself
to be invested
with a figurative
significance
which is conveyed outside us.
This is neither more nor less miraculous
than the emergence

47
of love from desire,
or that of gestg
unco-ordinated
movements of infancy.

view of language

Let us now see how this
of thought,

world,

and body can be of help

the dichotomy

between the knowing subject

noted

in this

section

that

view,

cannot

exist

earlier

Merleau-Fonty's
significance

in and through

Moreover,

part

of embodied existence

gesture.

Understanding

as integrally
helpful

axis

around which to integrate

We
in
its

saw that

for Merleau-

symbiotic

relationship

language

as mediated

as gestural

can,

each receiving

We also

with both thought

dimension

of overcoming

and language

we have come to see that

language

connected

in the task

in a similar

to each other.
and parcel

as an integral

separately,

exist

from the

and the known object.

thought

the other.

Ponty the world and language

2e

itself

is

through

from start

to finish,

and the world,

and

provides

a

the knower and the known,

namely the body itself.
In traditional
been regarded

as the mind alone,

been separated
senses.
language,

language

while

the objects

philosophy,

is at least

disembodied

question.

Language,

existence.

Thought,

has generally

to be known have

mind is out of the

gestural,

grows out of bodily

gestures,

mediates

epistemology,

of knowledge because

and language

1n

in the knower's

it

in the world.

in the body in the following

embodied in language

is always

and thus embodied,

inherently

is grounded

thought

the

gestural

in Merleau-Ponty's

from the objects

however,

originally

thought

being

the body, which in turn
"grounded"

the knowing subject

from the knowing mind by the body, · specifically

ln ~erleau-Ponty's

and therefore

separated

epistemologies,

way.

cannot

be

is "grounded"

1n

Thought is

Thought is always

grows out of speech,

both kinaesthetic

our embodied

which in turn

and tonal.

Therefore,

48
thought

is grounded

the world,
bodies

because

inhabit
Although

in the body. Body, for its
it

the world,
thought,

sense hierarchically
others.

They are,

gap between

language,
related

rather,

says that

to each other,
dimensions

that

once and f or all,
83

It

in
our

to the world.

the body, and the world are in some
none is the cause of the

of each ot her.

is this

symbiotic

the body, and the world that

mind when he promised

dichotomy."

and thus they belong

philosophy.

language,

behind us,

Merleau-Ponty

is grounded

Therefore,

the knower and the known need or can arise

Merleau-Ponty's
thought,

is of the world.

part,

"we shall

in

relationship
Merleau-Ponty

have the opportunity

the traditional

no

subject-object

between
had in

to leave
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Chapter Two
Merleau-Ponty's

Relational

ln Chapter One of the present
Merleau-Ponty'•
empiricism,

philosophy

as gesture,

relate

and Kant's

other

point

the order

that

categories

persons.

in which Merleau-Ponty

world.

and finally

Given that

knowledge and experience
relationship,

Rowever, I shall
tradi.tional
latter

three

One learns
people,
the self

of these dimensions

from the others,

than the

which might be implied by the

kinds of knowledge.

is primordial

For Merleau-Ponty

kin4• of knowledge is primary ~or prior

as oth~rs

and each other.

the

importance.

order . ~ather

namely that ·''the knowledge of t_he self

i~ Jelation

of

in a symbiotic

does not seem to be of great

to know oneself

just

mov s on to the

at the knowledge of the

significance

follow Merleau-Ponty's
.·,, .t

for the other

of these

its

one to avoiu assumptions

order,

the basis

arrives
three

with these

used in modern philosop hy,

are for Merleau-Ponty,

each iettin~

order of investigation

all

our knowledge of

deals

·wit ·h the knowledge of the self•

knowledge of others,
external

of the body and langua e

It.· ,should be noted at this

is not the one traditionally

where one starts

of language

to see how

categories:

and the self.

of

waa examined.

hia philosophy

of the roles

to three aain epiateaological

his critique

epistemology

Now it is tiae

understanding

the world,

First

of the body, including

was explicated.

Merleau-Ponty's

study the focus was on

of embodiment.

intellectuali•••

Then his philosophy

Epistemology

none

to any other.

to the . world and to other

and the world as well are known in relation
Therefore,

by the sequence of ~he followi?g

no hierarchical

discussion.

53

and

order

to

ia iaplied

i
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l.

Our ~nowledge of the World

In Merleau-Ponty's

phi l osophy, what is often

misl ead in g term of "ext er na l world"
embodied self

and other

independently

in abs t ract

traditional
first

philosophies.

chapter,

we noted i n the second part of the
reality

havin& to look around us.

our arma cannot be said to be resting
in the way that
In other

the flower vase.
abstract
neither

apace,

and move within

Aa Merleau-Ponty

on the table

words, our body ia not a neutral

it is our way of being-in-the-world.

and inert

next to

the candle can be aaid to be next to

can it be said of othe~ objects

as eternal

for Merleau-Ponty.

we know where our body ia and in what position

our limbs are without

other objects

to the

Things do not exist

space becomes apace as we interact

More pointedly,

says,

Aa

to by the

as is the case in many other more

apace ia not an abstract

On the contrary,
it.

is known in relation

embodied persons.
space,

referred

ent i ties

apace.

they exist

Because we inhabit

apace in and through our bodies,

the thin&• which are in space with

us are inhabited

Therefore,

relationship

by us as well.

with objects

the world bec,uae
incarnated
linguistic,
relational

in it.
so c i al,
quality

in

Moreover,

in the world that

in abatract

object

we are in an intimate

because we share apace with them~ We know

we belong to it and are of it,
Merleau-Ponty
and sexual,

eaploya

because we are

the metaphor of intercourse,

aa a way of atTeaaing

the deep

of our knowledge of the -world of thin&••

To this extent, every perception ia a c0111111unicationor a
c01&111.uni
on, the taking up or completion by ua of some
extraneous intention
or, on the other hand, the complete
expression outside ourselves of our perceptual powera and
coition,
so to speak, of our body with things. 1

In traditional
the known ia,

epiateaologiea

I think,

partly

a model for knowing.

distort

reality,

giving

rise

error,

Traditionally,

the body is said to

because

se paration

Vision in Merleau-Ponty's
"touch at a distance,"

palpates,

philosophy

world,"

and the object.
as a form of

is understood

and thus even with respect

to seeing

the visible

thinga. 112 It

ia,

therefore,

that we are in t.oucb with the so-called

As

also

"external

up with phenomena in an integral,

fashion.

-

--

In the Visibl e and th e I nvisible

Merleau-Ponty

speaks of the

relatio

n between our 1elvea and th e worl d more specifically.

linked

up with physical

phenomena because we are like

are made of the 1ame material,
term "flesh"

in a rather

in the tradit ,ional

signifiea

the qualitative

.!!:!,., and the objects

namely flesh.

technical

to matter

thickness"

no gap

and that which is "gazed at."

since we are a lways linked

inextricable

in such a way aa to

puts it in his last work, "the look ••• envelopea,

espouses

through vision

thus

dichotomy in epistemology.

between the subject

can ar ise between the "gazer"
Merleau-Ponty

through

seeing has always implied a

liowever, even this model is used by kerleau-Ponty
thi•

aa

seeing baa been the

gap between the viewer and the viewed,

to the subject-object

counteract

of vision

because the body can be transcended

11

or epistemic

of the knower from

of the dallinance

with Plato

and truth:

truth,

the "eye of the soul.
distance

a reault

Beginniq

paradigm of both error

the aepai-ation

sense.

similarity

in the world.

We are

the,

Merleau-Ponty

way, and does not

see■

liowever, the aetaphor
between our bodies,
lie speaks of this

because we
use• this
to limit
of flesh

which we

"invisible

between the seer and the seen in the followiog

way:

it

55
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·· 'Between the alleged colors and viaiblea,
we would find
anew the tiaaue that linea thea, auataina thea, nouriahea
· tbea, and which for it a part ia not a thin&, b~t a
poaaibility,
a latency, and a flesh of tbi11&••
It is that the thickness of fleah between the aeer and the
thin& ia constitutive
for the thing of ita visibility
aa
for the aeer of bia corporaity;
it ia not an obatacle
between them, it is their meana of cOURunication ••• The
thickneaa of the body • •• ia ••• the sole mean~ I have to ao
into the heart of thi11&•, but aak~ .lli ay1elt a world and by
making them fleah.
According
and a flesh
ayaelf

to the above quotations,

of ouraelvea,

"the thicknesa

a worid and the world a fleah.

of our mutual interdependence
visible
flesh
sort

there

upon the viaible.
ia not matter,

of incarnate

are flesh,
because

too.

As

This c0111111on
fleab

and reciprocity,

I underatand

Merleau-Ponty

things

space aa we do.

but things

by Merleau-Ponty

in the following

similarity

"It , auftice•

moment to note that

he who seea cannot posaess

i• poaaesaed by it,

unleaa he is of it. 117

aonisa

Thia moniam is,
inanimate
other.
principle"

notion

It aerves,

kind of living

matter,
Fleah ia,

between the
ia expreaaed
for us for the

the visible . unless

be

---

Merleau-Ponty's
8

in the world

the aaae

and the perceived,
way:

it "a

are aaid to be flesh

The qualitative

knower and the ~nown, the perceiver

interpret.

lie calla

t hey are in communication with ua and inhabit

relational

over of the
aaya that

either.

We are flesh,
it,

is a reault

"a coilin&

but it ia not ideational
6

of thin&•"

of the body" which can make

115 Furthermore,

principle.u

ia a "fleah

of "fleah"

I think,

aa a pivotal

aa an alternative

however,

bipolar

ia especially

metaphor,

to traditional

at the outaet.

incorporatiq

dualisma.

mind, on the

a unique phenomenon, "an incarnate
both pbyaical

reality

to

auggestin&

It is neither

on ~he one band, nor disembodied
rather,

difficult

and more,

a

57
simultan~oualy

•nd inai•tin&uishably.

John Sallis
seen,
this

calls

the relationship

between the body and the world,

between the seer and the
"incor~oration."

He puts

it

way:

In vision the thing seen is incorporated,
the body draws
the t~saue of the thin& to itself
in such a way that the
thing is made to function as an extension of •y•elf as
visible ••• the thing seen serves as the mediation by which I
would be completely present to myself, by which the bodily
reflection,
th§ seeiq
of myself aeeiq 1 would be brouaht
to completion.
As Sallis

unders.tanda

Merleau-Ponty's

knowledae of the world,
to the known.
subjects

each other,

because

it

is

of knowledge as independent
it has become clear

to be complete.

extension

of the body by Merleau-Ponty.

The perceived

In order better

to understand

the body and thing•

in the world,

also "perceive"

things

explain.

Since we are embodied beinas,

from one kinaesthetic

a cup for instance,

side of it.
object
this

perspective

By aeeing

where.!!.

are.

that
Sallis

entities

object

objects.

as an

between

to explain

Let me try to
an

As we look at an

frca any one perspective
one side we are,

how

In his view, the

we can only experience

at a time.

from

needs the

relationship

the human body.

explains

of

apart

ia regarded

it might be helpful

views tbe role of perceived

to talk

a perceiver

the intimate

perceived

object,

that

to our

when in relation

no longer appropriate

perceived

Merleau-Ponty

with respect

the knower ia only coaplete

Therefore,

and objects

thouaht

we see only one

in a sense,

told by the

this . odd sounding phenomenon in

way:

The thing, in its very
seeing, points to that
to the seer's position
reflecting
back to the

way of presenting
itself
to ay
place from which it ia seen, points
in the midst of the visible,
thereby
seer an image of himself aa ao
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.. po•itioned.
We have all
carvival,

Hence, in 1eein& thing1

probably

experienced

1omethin& of tbi1 phenomenon at a

Sometime, the only way we can tell

down i1 from the fact
be upaide down.

that

the world .out1ide

that~

in a
are upside

of the plane appear•

Renee, we are told by our envirooment

to

how we are

in it.

The thinas

in the world and our bodiea,

and ayabiotic
identity
iu

seeing. lO

when we have been turned up1ide down while riding

loop-o-plane.

placed

I see ayaelf

relationship

and 1ianificance

identity

in relation

and significance

Mind" Merleau-Ponty
relationabip

to each other.

color , depth,

make1 the followina

whic h are there

The tbin&1 aet their

to the tbinga.

In "Eye and

remark about the intearal

and the aenaed:

before

are in an organic

to the body and the body aet1

in relation

between the sensible

then,

us, are there

"Quality,

light,

only becau1e they

awaken an echo in our body and because the body welcomes ' tbem. 1111
Consider
feel

that

planning
be."

1ome concrete

~aaplea.

they need to apend

ti■e

to work with in order

Eskimo artists

merely releasing

for inatance,

with the atone which they are

to find out what the stone "wants to

have been reported

the figure

Soae aculptors,

fr011 within

aa 1aying that

they are

the atone.

In Eakimo art an artiat'•
carvings are responses to the
material which he works. In the sananguaq-art
context bis
responses are physical,
aenauous, tactile
and intuitive.
The material suggests the subject matter which in turn
suggests fora.
Tiktak bas said:
'I do not think out what
I will do. My tbougbi coaes out while I work. My work
expresses my thought. 2
.
.
.
Usina Sallis•

terainolo&y,

a re1pon1e frca
Merleau-Ponty

the aubject.

spoke of thia

the object

1n quest ion 1eema to "solicit"

Already in Pbenomenolo&Y 2!. Perception,
intercoaaunication

behleen

the body and

59

the objec ,ta . ~o the world in the followin& way:
It ia my gaze which aubteoda the color and the aovemeot of
ay hand which aubtenda the objects form, or rather ay &a&e
pair• off with color, and my hand with hardnesa and
aoftness,
and in thia tranaactioo
between the aubject of
aenaation and the aenaible it cannot be held that one acta
while the other suffers thy action, or that one confers
aignificance
on the other. 3
Up to this

point we have talked

the known object
other

aa symbiotic

about the body'•

in a atrictly

positive

words, the two have been aaid to exist

relationship

to each other .

sheds li&ht oo an additional
to focua the tension

of this

which necesaarily

manner.

In

however, which

relationship.

auat exist

He seeks

between the subject

and the object

of knowledge. Although they are in a symbiotic,

interdependent

relationship,

absolute

harmony.

condition

for there

and body-subject

not be thought of as in

they mut

~egardless

of the fact

that

beina any known objects,

are in a dialectical

••• They are joined
21

11

mutual dependence.

relationship

subject

and the object

keeps them together.
aeema to apply.

reality,
tension

in their

In a aenae,

to each other.

opposed in their

the difference
aa much as their

Again, the analogy of a magnetic

The poaitive

and negative

significance,

between the interdependent
for their

then,

respective

poles

these objects

because of their

opposition,

keepa them apart

as well aa their

the condition

the body ia a
aa such,

Bannan aays t hat "the terms are bound toaether
differences

between the
commonality
force-field

poles each receive

their

fr0111the opposing other.
i~ both a function

r.ealities.

of and

So, too, with the

knower and the known.
Language alao plays a crucial

to

io a constructive

Bannan sakes a point,
aspect

relationship

role

in our coaing to know the

The
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world,

acco ·rding

do not first

to Merleau-Ponty.

However, a• we aoted earlier,

have language aDd then naae object•

the world and laquage,

aa symbiotic

ahape each other.

liD&uiatic

as well as eabodied beiqa.

Therefore,

we coae to know the world a•
Our language both effect•

but it ia also effected

our reality,

world in which we live.

Aa was aentioned

Eskimo• have over thirty

word• for different

their

world is aade up almost entirely

can be ar &ued that

there

and affected

in the first

Eskimo children

of snow.

language,

by the

chapter,

At the aaae time,

is a sense in which they have thirty

are inculturated

they COllleto.!!!

and

kinda of snow because

of snow because they have so aany words for it.
youq

Rather,

dimenaiona of our embodied

existence,

affects

with it.

we

into

kinda

That ia to say, as

their

these aany different

language we uae in f l uences bow we experience

it

world through
kinda of snow.

The

our world and thus how

we know our world.
To turn the matter
certain

realities

around ., people who do not have words for

do not,

in many cases,

here one is reminded of Charles
of Tierra

Darwin's

del Fuego made absolutely

ship which lay at anchor off their
simply too far beyond their
though they paid a great

Darwin and the crew bad come ashore.
grows out of our interaction

of the effects
be said that

account of how the natives

presumably becauae it was

experience

deal of attention
'

those realities.

no acknoweldgement of the huge
shore,

nautical

experience

14

and vocabulary,

to the rowboat•
Laoauage,

with the world,

change and reflect

in soae instances

one's

reality.

one'•

in which

for Merleau-Ponty,

and thus we cannot speak

of language on the world in a vacuum.
at least

even

However, it can

language can create,

Merleau-Ponty

coapares

the

61
relationahip

· between one'•

.
an d t b e oraan1aa

body and the world to that

wh.1ch it. rea1 d ea. lS

.

0

10

a• beina in a livin& relationship
world and givea
world.

a concrete

Aa

Ponty offer,
that

with the world;

the world,

oraanic

of our encounter

relationship,

cube.

he ara uea t hat we do not add up all

Furthermore,
we receive

frOll various

a cube.

are experiencing

perspective•

On the contrary,

ua as a cube in the aaae way that
aa a coaplete

part,

me, it is a given,

not a concluaion.

self-evident.
extenaion

for ua;

its

it ia a

the

and conclude

that we

the cube is experience d by

say a foot,

it in ita entirety.

there

know that

and

a part of our own body is

any time perceive

is already

Merleau-

we can only see the cube froa one an&le at a time,
the whole cube, we nevertheleaa

experienced

the

with a cube. 16 He aaya

thu• never perceive

aenaationa

&

it ia both

and yet it ca~not °live wit hout the

example of this

an analysia

although

The body ia thua understood

-.,

~

life

between a heart

even though we do not at

• Ky body ia "already
Similarly.

reality

the world,

and wholeness

there"

for

the cube,

ia , in a sense,

The world is in some sense part of me, it is an
of my body , and therefore

an inierential

process

Merleau-Ponty

expresaea

world quite

pointedly

in order
thia

it is not necessary

to be assured

relationship

of its

to engage 1n

existence.

between the body and the

when he says:

The thing, the world, are given to me along with the parts
of my body, not by any 'natural geometry,' but in a living
connection comparable, or rather identical,
that
existin& between the parts of my body itself.

wf~b

External
natural
identity

objecta

objecta,

therefore,

in abstract

and aianificance

apace,

for Kerleau-Ponty

are not mere

but they are endowed with their

in relation

to the _knowiq

if the world and our bodies are woven together

body.

It ia aa

by mean• of their
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■utual

interaction

reflected

into a seaalesa

by ·our . ia~guage.

very effecti¥ely

fabric

whose pattern

Merleau-Ponty

when be says that

there

p~ppoints

is traced

this

and

interaction

is

a relationship
of active transcendence between the subje~t
and the world.
l 'be world is inseparable
from the subject,
but from a subject which is nothing but a project of the
world, and the subject is inseparab}§ from the world, but
from a world which projects itself.
A bit

later

on we shall

see how the aelf

For now it ia sufficient

1a a project

of the world .

to focua on bow the world is a project

of

the knowing body-aubject.
Kallin
notes

coaea to this

t he fact

discussion

that we know there

from an intereating

is a six-sided

object

u1 even though we can at most only see three .sides
He is concerne d about the question
pe r s petival
that

vi ewa of an object

these vi ews theaaelvea

of a complete obje~t.

perspectives

we have of an object

to each other.

of a cube, for example,
10

with the conclusion
&ather,

the object

incomplete

says that

tbe anales

cube.

Therefore,

add our perceptual
that

to ua

the various

connection
that

to ua

conn ected

because

if one

a person uaually

haa

seldom if ever would one be able to arrange

ayanetrical

not mathematically

inc0111plete

and thus suggest

a sequence in such a way that

be a six-sided,

of

are almost "mystically"

There is mystery in their

were to take photogr _apha of all

the photos

Mallin

in front

make it very clear

are incc:aplete,

the re a lity

He

at any given tiae.

of how it is that

nevertheless

angle.

there

in question

views we have of it.

the result
Kallin

senaationa

ia a six-sided

ia auggeated

would in fact
thinks,

together

object

and come up

here before

or mediated

Thia is bow Kallin

we do

us.

to us by the

states

the point:

Yet we have seen that the thing "emanates" troa within i t s
appearancea.
Thia follows because if the appearances are
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su~ficiently
fulfilled
or "fixed" they refer ua to a
conatant property which carried the accent of the thing
ita e lf.
iven when these appearances are too vague to give
ua a particular
thing, they still
refer us generally
§o
that ~hicb bas triggered
their confused preaentation. 1
Mallin'•

remarks remind me of the way metaphors

language are often
not tell

ill

au&gesting

said to funct i on.

fonia of speech do

t he trut h in any given ut teranc;:e, but tell
the whole truth,

given obj ect auuests
a s i x-aided
incomplete

As indirect

and indirect

too a limited

10

and mediates

cube is experienced
perspectives

it "slant,

perapectival

the whole object.

view of a

The fullness

in and through the particular

available

1120

to us at any one time.

yet ·

And yet,

the cube cannot be reduced to a mere collection

of such perspectives,

but r ema ina a mystery which is evoked by thea.

Moreover, without

these perspectival
all.

particulara

we would not experience

Thus the complete viewa are both necessary

suffici

of the visual

the cube at

and, in a sense,

ent for us to know the cube, while the latter

the sum total

of

is not simply

part icula _rs from which it emanates or

through which it is mediated.
The knowing subject

and the known object

Ponty,

never thought of as separate

single

relational

phenomenon.

entities

They together

are,

then,

but are aspects

A knower becomes a knower in relation

known object

gets

knowing subject.
to a consideration
at the outset
persona.

its

significance

chapter,

namely that

in relation

to a

_in mind, let us now aove on

of the second epistemological

of this

each

to the known, and a

and identity

With thi s understanding

of a

make up the rea li ty

which is knowing, and hence they can be said to constitute
other.

fo r Merleau-

category aeotioned

of our knowledge of other
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2.

Our ~oowledae of Other Peraona

We can know other
have livina

people,

in Merleau-Ponty'a

bodiea with the aaae atructurea

view, becauae they

and function•

"Io ao far aa I have aenaory functiona ••• I am already
coamunicatioo
1122

aubjecta.

with othera
Aa

taken aa aimilar

we encounter

another

tbia

do.

Thia aimilar

peraoo interactin&

Merleau-Ponty

awakena within

in the aame way aa we

ua a kind of echo.

We recognize

other

proceaa,

which we discern

interaction

between their

We are qualitatively

alike.

but aa subject•

and agents,

c01D1Don
world.

Kerleau-Ponty

context,
another.

sake

up.

since other

In fact,

but by meana of a reaonance
with the world and our

we do not experience
as living

maintain,

humane as part of a ahared reality,
ourselves

peraon, and
prolongation
o~
with the world. 3

peraona in the aaae way aa we know ouraelvea,

not by meana of an inferential

objecta

As

aaya:

·•••Y body perceive• the body of another
diacovera in that other body a airaculoua
my intenaiona,
a familiar way of dealing

own.

with objecta

only to ua, we are aware

other bein& deala with the objecta
behavior

in

paycho-pbyaical

in the world which we thought were familiar
that

aa our own.

that

bodies

'part'

inhabiting

we experience

the other

the tera

each other

part

a

other

of which we

is misleading

human beinga and we cannot be separated

lt would be better

aa

to speak of two dimensions

in this
from one

of one

phenomenon.
As it ia the case with other
embodied aelvea,
Merleau-Ponty'a

things

in the world and our own

ao it ia alao with our knowledge of other
epistemology.

Aa

I and the external

persona

world together

in
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create

a coamaooepiatemic

to other

embodied aelvea

previoua

aection

r eality,

so alao _doea tbe body io relation

cr eate and auatain

we considered

the body'•

a aha red reality.
relation

In the

to th i n&• in the

wor ld and it waa mentioned

that

" at uff" as the world , that

they share in the cOIIIDlonality of the

" fleah."

Furthentore,

we noted that

world and the body is
Aa

the various

the body ia made up of the aame

parts

li ke that

the relationship

between different

of the body fora an organic

body and the world constitute

such a ayntheais.

speaks of our knowledae of ot her persona,
this

particular

co-operation
functional
rather

analogy.

than seeking

parts

of the body.

syn t hesis,

so the

When Kerleau-Ponty

he 1pecifically

eaploya

For him, the body makes up a ayatea in

with other
and oraanic

_ between the

bodies,

not a mechanical

one which presupposes

system but a

a mutual understanding

one.

Henceforth, as the parts of my body together coapriae a
system, so my body and the other peraon'a are one whole,
two aides of one and .the same phenomenon, and the anonymous
existence of which my body is the ever-renewed ~ ace
4
henceforth inhabits both bodies simultaneously.
The collllllunion we share with other
"interaubjectivity."
interaction

The interaubjective

aaongat embodied subjects

share a common fact
Merleau - Ponty,
from sere

living

primordial

world is created
who inhabit

of bein& linguistic

language
bodies,

level:

like

aniaals.

calls
by tbe

a c0111111on
world and
In fact,

for

other

persons

· By lan&uaae, of course,

lanauage,"

gesturality.

Merleau-Pon t y we experience
gestur al communication.

beinas.

is that which distinguishes

does not mean simply "empirical
moat

people Kerleau-Ponty

·but linauiaticality

he
· at its

In other words, accordiD& to

persona aa persona primarily

In the aeaturea

of otbera

by their

we encounter

and
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discern

intentions

like

our own.

The COJlllllunication or coaprehenaion of gestures comes about
through the reciprocity
of my intension•
and the gestures
of others, of my gestures and intentions
discernible
in the
It is aa if the 2~her person'•
conduct of other people.
intentions
inhabited my body and mine his.
ln fact,
experience
children

if explicit,

oth~rs

aa persons,

as persons,

yet.

They are not,

their

bodies;

participate

formal language was necessary

since

they do not have t his type of language as

they kick and aqueeze,

would naturally

cry and amile.

In a word, they

Converaely,

to experience

if explicit,

other•

aa peraons,

we

think of computer• aa persona aince

they excell

at

so r t of communication.

Merleau-Ponty'a

because they speak with

through geature.

formal language waa aufficient

thia

we would not think of very young

however, prelin&uistic,

in laoauage

to

Language,

view for connecting

an intersubjective

world.

then,

ia crucia l in

human beings with each other

As Merleau-Ponty

himself

in

puts it:

ln the experience of ~ialogue, there is constituted
between
the other person and myself a common ground, my thought and
his are interwoven into a single fabric, my words and those
of my interlocutor
are called forth by the state of the
discussion,
and they are inserted into a shared operation
of which neither of us is the creator.
We have here a dual
being, where the other is for me no longer a mere bit of
behavior in my transcendental
field, nor I in bis;
we are
collaborators
for each other in the consW111Datereciprocity.
Our perspectives
merge igto each other, and we co-exist
through a COllllllonworld.
The role of language
connection

in Merleau-Ponty's

philosophy,

between human beings with the interaubjective

as the

world,

and

thus as the means of our knowledge of other · peraona as human, is
explained
aays,

beioa.

by

ia that

aichard

Lanigan quite

illuainatingly.

which ll&kes us aware that

"Speaking eaergea

a 'verbal

the other

gesticulation'

Speaking,

he

is a conscious

which auggesta

a
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-. 1127 Thoughts can never be made objective

consciousneu
except

through speech,

speech which aediates
ua to others
this

understood

broadly

as gestural.

the hwaanness of other

as conscious,

intentional

and public

persons

beioas.

thus ~ it is
to ua and links

Mallin ~&rees with

point when he says:

1

Others are available
to us in the same way as we are aware
of ourselves,
as body-subjects,
and the~r actions are given
to us as structures,
intentions,
or manners of being in the
world.
Merleau-Ponty maintains that the smalleat movement
by the other • is given to us as a gesture, conduct, or
28
'c<aportment • '
Accordin,

to Merleau-Ponty,

person s within

we experience

the interaubjective

other

selves,

are actually
evident

existence.

pose a question

of the reality

shows that

another

that

other

another'•

.
huger,

,9

significance.
laughter
primordial
persons.

Children

connection
they interact~

gaaea,

or in playing

as aoaethin& they,

Even to

ia presupposed,

A newly born baby
A

in human intersubjectivity

in various

such as pretendin&

order

another

too, can do;

intersubjective

person's

saile

they experience

others.

to

· such activities

and c01111Ronalitybetween themselves
others.!!

by

and a fifteen-month

"peek-a-boo."

have firat

experience

persona.

existence

smile,

of

on the aelf-

are given as real.

the mother's

on the part of small children

atemming

since Descartes,

they rest

an answer.

persons

participates

can participate

V

the existence

of other

person's

to provide

to and imitating

old child
bite

behavior

old baby alrady

responding

concerning

phenomenon in that

aince someone must be there

ten-day

naturally

which have plagued modern philosophy

or given character

shows by its

the latter

Queations

a parasitic

aa

world th r ough our comaon

embodiment and langua&e as gesture,
from our bodily

and know each other

and
a
and other

,.
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.,Between my consciouaneas and •Y body as I experience it,
between this phenomenal body of mine and that of another aa
I see it from the outside,
there exists an internal
relation
which causes the other to appear as the coapletion
of the syst em. The poaaibility
of another perao,n' .a beina
self-evident
is owed to the fact that I aa not transparent
to my~5lf, and that ay subjectivity
draws its body in its
wake.
The relationship
river

betwen myself and others

and a riverbed.

ia determined
the river

by the riverbed,

determines

Each is dependent
identity

pers on'•

previous

responses

influence
section

to the next,

in the world.

even more obvioua with respect
with the notion
called

to a previous

one baa heard another

aa a fast

each reaponse

ao too do land
We noticed

other

The effecting

of

power of language

to human beinas.

We are all

prophecy;"

or slow learner

persona

in the previous

and shape our experience

of a "aelf-fulfillin&

and treated

aet our

We are like

is a response

eacb .other. 31

language can influence

nonhuman objects

to aay that

One does not come with ready-aade

and "conatitute"
that

interaction.

In the aaae way that

rise

aa true

and depth of the riverbed.

is made only after

statement.

and gives

and depth of the river

So, too, do I and others

each statement

to a dialogue.

influences

width,

froa our autual

response

that between a

and yet it is just

on the other.

in a dialoaue,

A specific

width,

the direction,

and character

atatements
one.

The direction,

ia like

if a child

repeatedly

1s

familiar
is

in achool and

at home, she or be might very well become what these expectations
call

for.

Therefore,

language can be seen to have a atrona

play in the conatruction
on the general

of our knowledae of other

or specific

one and the aaae exiatential
ivity

level :.

persona,

role

whether

Other persona and l are part

fabric,

of one cOlllllonhuman experience.

to

we ahare in the interaubject-

of
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What exactly
interaubjective

does Merleau-Ponty
world?

his understandin&
consider

subject,
Therefore,

within

interact

and independent

objective

dimension.

In traditional

aeparatina

subjects

knowing subjects
of thinking

gave rise

of other minds arises,
uninten~ional

bodiea.

The subjects

each other by their

11

32

bodily
thought

of one another.

of as

Ibis

times ia called

In Merleau-Ponty's

As Laurie

each other

and cauain& us to think of

i~dependently

since other

il

bodies are generally

to what in contemporary

minds.

a

of relationships

becauae they are mediated

fr0111each other

reaides.

such

Aa

a woven pattern

thouaht

as existin&

problem of "other

bein&•

t./

to the

pbenOlllenon, neither

terms "interaubjectivity."

than beina separated~

aind

be speaks of the aind as

houae" in which the subject

they create

with one another

of others

bther,

from

arises

He doe• not

The body thus becoaes integral

nor a purely

which Merleau-Ponty

notion

aa embodied.

the human being ia a aubejct-object

body-subjects

rather

a body.

than a "priaon

subjective

interlace

this

aa a ,elf-contained

in the body.
rather

it,

of the human subject

or soul installed

purely

Aa I underatand

the huaan subject

incarnated

mean, when he apeaka of the

philosophy,

way

the

no problem

persona are not bidden within
Spurlin& COllllllents, the existence

ia a given {act of our existence.

We cannot get away froa

others.
Other people are a permanent hori&on to my existence,
like
a constant double at my aide.
It ia the fact that my
existence ia conatantly de-centered,
since it is an
interpla y between aenerality
and individuality,
between
anonyaity

and reflection,

other.as I j§e neralized
experience.
The existence

of others

that

I,"

I find

a potential

is not a question

the experience

of the

in allay

here because their
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bodies and our• toaether
myself in relation
to me.

to other•

If I can raiae

peraona,

I

■uat

JUke each other

oth ers.

and other•

the question

with other

of the existence

speakers.

overlap

and lntersect.

preface

to his early

then,

is created

body-subjects

various

experiences

people's

intersect

become selves

and one's

only in relation

own self

to others,

of other

the reality

child

naturally

takes up ita position

other

persons.

"The perception

one attempts

world are problematical

at0111iatic apace,
existence,
other

a position

is impossible.

persons

is primordial

exist.

kerleau-Ponty
a

to

people and the
only for adults.

persona

position

In a deep sense,

accessible

The child
to all

is only a problem when
in an abstract,

which, at the basic

within

As

even

pe~aona never arises;

i ngly believes

of other

to take an "objective"

Since we

in the world in relation

of other

in a world whic h he unhesitat

problem.

alike,

it would seem strange

makes clear,

around him. 1135 The "reality"

world is not

are qualitatively

selves

lives

it in the

like geara. 1134

to ask bow we can know whether other

intersubjective

expressed

where the paths of my

persona poses no real

for a child

know

by mean• of the

"The phenomenoloaical

and engage each other

the awareness of other

■ust

and also where my own and other

intersect.

selves

tbrouab

whose phenomenal fields

Thia i• how kerleau-Ponty
major work:

Thia is so

which is learned

but the sense which is revealed

Since other

of other

If I know myself I

world,

of intentional

pure being,

are known by ae in relation

is an activity

An interaubjective

interaction

I can only know

be as aware of them as I aa of myself.

because aaking questions
interaction

known.

then,

human level

of

the knowledge of

our embodied existence.
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The .,not ton of sexuality
important

topic

to take up in connection

knowledge of other
to sexual

traditional
separate

persona.

relations

Merleau-Ponty

in the philosophy

Sexuality

of Merleau-Ponty

with our discussion
in this

context

in the narrow sense of the term.

sexuality

includes

psychology,

all

from the intellect,

acti11& independently

Merleau-Ponty,

on the contrary,

intimately

with the other

aspects

specifically

of sexuality,

is not limited
For
In

been regard~d

as

of other dimensions

of human existence.
connected

of the

of huaan affectivity.

the emotions have frequently

is an

thinks

they are

of our being.

Speaking

he says:

Sexual life is one more form of original
intentionality
•••
sexuality
is not an autonomoua cycle.
It baa internal
links with the whole active and cognitive being, theae ••• displaying one typical structure,
and s~indi11& in relation
to each other of reciprocal
expression.
We interact
affective

with each other

bein&s.
37

put s it.

Sexuality

Since sexuality

through our c0111111onality
as sexed,

is our "openness"

is _a torm of intentional~ty,

power, 1138 it ia not to be understood
describes
connects

as a purely

bodily

the human way of being-in-the-world.
affectiveness

to exemplify

with other

how sexuality

aspects

is a dimension

For him, " ••• sight,

hearing,

routes,

or manifestationa

latter

to others,

instruments

takes up and absolves
.

anonymous l y given.
According

sexuality,

into

"a general
instinct,

ot our co111J11on
life

in order

of human inter-relations.
the body are not only the

of peraonal

itself

their

interpretation,

awareness or knowledge ot others
interaubjectivity

but

kerleau-Ponty

existence:

exiatence

for Merleau-Ponty

any

is grounded in human sexuality.
is dependent

the

as it is

,,39

to this

Thia is so because

as Barral

on human
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aftectivene.a~,

and this

beina-in-the~world.

in turn ia anchored in our embodied way of

Human aexuality,

within

and flows fr<llll the interaction

aelvea

in a phyaical

provides

and social

in this

is the individual

between embodied, intentional

context.

"consciouaneaa"

affective

Such interaction,

re lat ionsbip

in turn,

of our knowledge of

thought

there

"deaire. 1140 As the individual

differences

This create& a tension

relationships.

Each person,

from

This process

body-subjects

they become aware of their

difference&,

is a transformation

to "aelf-consciousness."

commonality.

aaona human b,iin&a, it

which gain the awarenesa of identity.

body-subjects

In Merleau-Ponty'a

Ibis

bein&, ariaea

aa human persona.

Moreover,

other,

lin&uistic

for and the expreaaion

both the basia

one another

like

within

by recognizin&

interact

begins with
with each

as well as of their
their
others

interthrough these

also becomes aware of bia or her own diatinctivenesa.
aU111111.arizea
the way in which individual

is how kallin

consciousness

self-

arises:

••• in treating
the other as a unique spatio-temporal
clear in g, I bec0111eaware of a difference ••• between our
clearings ••• Each begins to define himself as a
person ••• througb expreasilf
exchanges and emotional
relations
with the other.
If in tact
field

or fabric,

of others

there

we all

are,

as persona,

then it follows
can exist

that with respect

no epistemic

known.

If there

selves,

it would be necessary

part of a c~Dlllon relational
to the knowledge

gap between the knower and the

were such a dichotomy between the self
and problematic

essentially

different

entities.

and reality

from our relationships

Since,

to speak

and other
of two

however, we get our identity

to one another

this

poaaibility
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never actu.a ll~ ariaea.
and the known, according
eap~cially

Thus no diatance

remain& between the knower

to Merleau-Ponty'a

wheD we conaider

philoaophy,

even and

the knowled&e of other aelvea.
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of Ouraelvea

3. Our ~owledae

Once aaain 1 would empbaaize that
three

epiateaological

categoriea,

for Merleau-Ponty

tbe world,

&elf, can be thought of aa independent
known in relation

to each ot her,

them must take place
Therefore,

knowledge muat bear thia

peraona,

of each other.

of ita

examination

relation

in mind.

are

of any one of

to the other

of Merleau-Ponty's

relat _ionality

and tbe

All three

and ao any diacuaaion

in the context

the following

other

none of the

two.

view ot aelf

i.ecall

what Merleau-

aaid about thia mutual interdependence:

Ponty himaelf

ot active tranacendence between the
There ia a relation
aubject and the world.
The world ia inseparable
froa the
subject,
but from a aubject which ia nothina but a project
of the world, and the subject ia inaeparable
from ~he
world, but froa a world which it project•
itaelf. 4
~nowlege of the aelt
Merleau-Ponty
Descartes

ia much ·aore myaterioua

than it waa for Deacartea.

may have been right

in first

or ambiguoua for

Although in~
trying

to obtain

knowledge, he was also quite

misguided

claiming

knowledge of the "pure"

ap~rt

to have arrived

from knowledge of the external

not realize
other
ia,

at,

that

things
therefore,

"unadulterated"
account.
foothold

in attempting,

and selves

aelf

to have initial

without

to have pure,

completely

aelves.

lie did

and total

with thea.
acceas

takin& the world and other

In a word, it is impoaaible
in a vacuum,

self,

ia molded in relation

by meana of our interaction

impoaaible

aelfindeed in

world and other

our knowledge of the aelf

aense

to
It

to a pure,

peraona into

to gain any epiatemoloaical
abatract

knowledge

of anythin&

wbataoever.
One of the firat

things

which should be recalled

and kept in
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miud when diacuaain&

our knowledge of ouraelvea

ia the fact

ia not a conaciouaneaa

or mind exiating

Merleau-Ponty

the aelf

independently

of the body.

always to be understood

self

is not,

philosophy
rather,

is,

body-aubject.

among other

for

rather.

it is the body-aubject.

a body as an object

intendin&

there

for Merleau-Ponty

as incarnated;

to be •~re,

aa a conscioua,

The 1elf

that

The

objects,

but

ln Merleau-Ponty's

is never a separation

between the mind and the body;

the body is flooded by the mind and the mind is the axis of
The mind is a dimension of the self,

the body.
thus neither
the se l f.
cha r acter

can be referred
It will

to without

be crucial

of the aelf

as is the body, and

at the same time referring

to remeaber this

in the following

to

multi-dimensional

diacuaaion

in order

to avoid

any dualist i c assumptions.
Furth naore,

to keep in mind that

it is helpful

Pon y th e

e l f is not primitive.

Thia meana that

the worl d

s sel ·ea, as atomiatic

"I"a.

to use the pronoun 'I'
themse l ves by t heir
Frequent l y a child
the objective
subject
that

calla

even remarks that
For his part,

it

herself

possibility
It is poasible

calla

learns

to call

not primitive

the

to use the

would se em to cor r espond to
self.

"in the pre-objective,

Merleau-Ponty

learn

by her own name, then ahe uses

of the individual
is clearly

in

people r ef er and speak to them.

case pronoun 11. 143 Thia pattern

of the development

for example,

they have learned

name, as other
first

we do not arrive

Children,

case pronoun 'me,' and finally

developin& reality,

fresh

only after

for Merleau-

If the aelf
in nature.

we cannot talk
11 11

1

"a field,

is a

Spurling

4
of a self. ,l+

an experience •••

of situationa,

45 rather

than a "self."

to consider

the topic

of self-knowledae

in the

&

philosophy

of Merleau-Ponty

would be tbia:
one'•

"Row ia aelf

own body ?"

affect

from three

Secondly,

knowled&e related

Finally,

by my relationship

to objects

us take up these questions
Fir st then,

in their

unified

whole, a "synae s thetic,
of the various

In other

words, it

from. its

texture

an object,

or any of its

ature.

Let

in Chapter One of

body creates

a

syste m in which the
separated.

to isola t e the color of an object
The red in cherry

perceptual

qualities,

ita

juice,

in a plush rug.

qua~i tiea.

example, suggests

In a similar

my self-knowledae

view one's

from that

other

people

between my self-knowledge

1146perceptual

is impossible

is very different

take another

to other

As was mentioned

and vice versa.

of its

knowledae of

senaes can never be absolutely

instance,

independently

to one'•

order.

what of the relationahip

work, in Mer le au-Ponty's

sensations

The first

in the world around ae?"

stated

and the awareneas of my own body?
the preaent

"Ia
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angles.

"How does my relationship

ay knowledae of ayself?"

affected

related

The color

of

cannot be experienced

The picture

taste,

for

smell,

of a casserole,
and even its

to

temper-

way, a blind person can be said to "see" with

the sense of touch and sound.
Another aapect

of the unified

own body comes to light
e an "affective

object"

quality

when we recall
for us.

Thus, the object

pain are one and the same.
question

are not united

affected

and the affecting

that

place

of our

our body can be said to

When we are in pain,

we both.!:!.!!!, the pain in a particular
pain ourselves.

of our experience

for example,

in our body and.!!!.

of the pain and the subject

Furthermore,

as two separate
are identical.

the subject
entitie

and object

a , but

On the basis

as~•

of this

in
of the
in
The

77
affective
exist

unity

it

is easy to see that

it is impossible

between the knower and the known with respect

of self-knowledge.

In this

case the subject

for a gap to

to the question

and the object

of

knowledge are one and the same.
It seems that

at least

knowledge,

with its

dichotomy,

as a paradigm

imply that

he maintains

in some sense Merleau-Ponty

inherent

impossibility

for all
that

kerleau-Ponty's
other

selves

for a subject-object

human knowing.

self-knowledge

our knowledge of the world and other

ourselves,

in that

to arise

is undercut

a structural

persons.

similarity

I do not mean to

provides

view our knowledge of things
bears

the basis

Rather,

I mean that

In some sense

for an epistemic

by the organic

epistemology
together

one could say that

epistemic
mutually

identity

a single

and s i gnificance

interdependent

can be interpreted

according
objects,

in Merleau-Ponty's

to Merleau-Ponty.
that

then,

from the other

since
their

by means of their

with respect

to each other

selves

epistemic

modes of knowing
and of

which knows are ~nderstood
as the self

It should be remembered that

the world and other

to its

In our knowledge of others

which is known and that

in self-knowledge.

unified

they each receive

as the paradigm for all

being in the same relationship

philosophy

of human

interaction.

The knowledge of the self,
unity,

reality;

gap

inter-connectedness

the knower and the · known are -organically

they constitute

in

to our knowledge of

of the mind, the body, and the world withi n the fabric
existence.

for

in the world and of

in each case the possibility
at the outset

uses self-

is to itself

in Merleau-Ponty's

are understood

the body, which in turn is the incarnation

as

as extensions

of the self.

Thus the

of
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knower and tbe known in each caae are inextricably
each other;

·each ia experienced

intertwined

and known aa a part

with

or aapect

of the

other.
Now we ahall
overall

topic

move on to the aecond conaideration

for thia

buaan beings affect
there

the condition

for all

not be articulated,
Neither

is a priaordial

other
since

awareneas,

reflection

and articulation

it ia also the condition

includin&

which ia
awareness

can

for articulation

and reflection

is necessarily

real

Mallin explain•

connection

itself,

preauppoae

some

one is not aware of ihis

take place.

the self

to

becauae it ia also the condition

it nevertheleaa

view of th is primordial

world,

This prilllordial

Thus, although

prilllordial

Ponty'•

awareneaa.

Both articulation

form of self-awareness.

According

awareneaa of oneself

is it reflective,

for reflectiveness.

our

bow doe• our knowledge of other

our knowledge of ouraelvea?

Merleau-Ponty,

itself.

aection:

within

because
Merleau-

between the self

in the following

and the

way:

Since a first perception,
that is to say, the taking notice
of a particular
and distinctive
phenomenon, ia only
possible through a rebalancin g of the body-subject'•
general grasp, before the first perception one must be
already
'alr~ady f~ work in a world' and spatially
acquired.
Merleau - Ponty himself
. world "the most ancient
Mallin
then,

terms thia

'x'

calla

this

primordial

pack. between 'x'
"a natural

relationship

and the world in general. 1148

or captive

self. 1149 There seema,

to be a self - awareness which cannot be articulated

ground out of which any explicit
emerges.

Thia primordial,

condition

for an articulated

awareness

pr~reflective

to the

but is tbe

or knowledge of the aelf
awarenesa of 'x'

ia the

knowledge of tbe self.

In Pben0111enology_tl Perception

Merleau-Ponty

termed thia

pre-
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reflective

-.elf,

or primordial

other hand, he called
cogito,"

the reflective

and claimed that

Second Meditation

"I,"

the "tacit

c:ogito ...

a ''verbal"

self

5

the

Ou

or Napoken

the "I" spoken of by Descartes

was the la tt er.

o

in hil

Mer le au- Ponty went on to say that

t he verba l co&ito is only po s ibl e because of the tacit

cogito.

Here

is how he put the mat ter:
••• I shoul d find {words } not so much deriva t ive and
inauthentic
as meanin&lesa, and I should be unabl e even to
read Descartea'
book, were I not, before any spee ch can
begin, in contact with my own life and thoug ht, and i f the
spo~en syaito did not encounter within one a tacit
cog1to.
~any of Merleau-Ponty'a
te rm " tacit

cogito"

interpreters

when discusain&

se lf , because Merleau-Ponty
wox-k, .!!!,!, Visible
end of this
originally

~

biaaelf

.!.!!!, Invisible.

are ill-at-ease

the poaaibility
rejected

with the

of the primordial

the term i n his last

ln the "Worki ng Notes"

at th e

volume, Merleau - Ponty reminds the read er of how he
talked

of a primordial

self - awareness

in th e Phenomenol ogy

of Perception:
The cogito of Desca r t e s •• • is an opera t ion on
significations,
a statement of relations
betwe en them ••• It
therefore presupposes a prereflective
contact of self with
self ••• or a tacit cogito ••• th i s is howl reasoned in
Phenomenology .2,!,Perception,
132 this correct? What I call
the tacit cogito ia impossible.
The reason,

according

to the "later

to have been wrong in calling
that

by de f inition

Consciouaneaa,

Merleau-Ponty,"

the primordial

"I" a tacit

cogitat i on can never be tacit

after

all,

while the notion

of tacit

expreaai on "tacit

cogito"

Thia is how Merleau-Ponty

can only be conacioua
awareneaa exclude•

expreasea

cogito

is

in nature.
and thus explicit,

articulation.

would seem to be a contradiction
himself

f or claiming

tbe problem:

The
in terma.
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·· To -have the idea of 'thinking,'
••• to aake the 'reduction,'
te retu~n to . i.aimanence and to consciousnesa ••• it is
necesaary to have words. It is by the combination of
words ••• that I fora the transcendental
attitude,
that l
constitute
the conatitutive
consciousness.
Yet there is a world of silence, ••• ,~ order where
there are non-lan.guage significations
•••
Merleau-Ponty

rejects

because thinkiq
which is tacit
of silence"

the tacit

(coaitation)

opinion,

Merleau-Ponty

ianored

his own criticism

cogito

the above quotation

while discussing

point he notes
tacit

cogito

did not explain

the speaking

cogito,

to the silent

self

he does not say that
as a cogito.

Rather,

1 did not arrive

thinks,

therefore,

Although at this

that

the concept of

in the main text
after

fortunately

cogito

this

way of

continued

to use the

of The Visible

the "Working Notes."
Merleau-Ponty

~ili,
Mallin

did not take heed

of his own criticism.
Other interpreters
maintain,

on the other

of Merleau-Ponty,
hand, partly

to

at a aolution ••• on the

I posed a problem." .54 Merleau-Ponty

which was written

to the tacit

he says that

11

cogito

a few

be was wrong in referring

contrary

of the tacit

to Mallin,

bow one moves from the silent

was incoaplete.

Invisible,

refers

of language.

speaking

notion

concerning

For example, just

in Phenomenology 2f Perception

that

who disagrees

According

Merleau-Ponty

the nature

coaito.

and went on u&ill& the notion

on in the "Working Notes" themselves.

pages after

The "world

himself,

cogito.

then,

in words and that

of Merleau-Ponty

of a tacit

note,

to articulate.

and with Mefleau-Ponty

of the notion

in this

to in terms of a tacit

is one interpreter

the rejection

later

iapoaaible

cannot be referred

with prevailin.g

at least

can only take place

is neceaaarily

Samuel Mallin

coaito,

specifically

on the atren.gth

bmy ~want,

of his aelf
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criticism,
tacit

that Merleau-Ponty

stronaly

footnote
quite

the notion

but much of the Pben011lenology .2f Perception

cogito,

Mallin

not only rejected

diaagrees

with thia

in bis book Kerleau-Ponty'a

interpretation.
Philosophy

of the
aa well.

In an iaportant
be atatea

bis caae

pointedly:
Merleau-Ponty is much too bard on hi.maelf in these notea,
for hia criticism
applies,
if at all, to aome noneaaential
arguaenta on two or three pages of the Phenomenology of
Perception where be aay have begun to slip into a Cartesian
mode of description ••• Merleau-Ponty'a
normal and intended
use . o.f the e~presaion 't•c.i:t co&ito' in both texta ia just
the oppoaite of a rationalist
one ••• thea! particular
notea
5
are of little
merit and very aialeadin&.
For myaelf,

tacit

cogito

be fell

l bad read through Merleau-Ponty'a

discuasion

of the

.2f Perception

ever thinking

that

in Phenomelogy

into a rationalistic

very clear
cogito

in abowing that

rests

of an unarticulated,

since

l think be was

interpretation

which does not entail

In fact,

sense.

On the contrary,

the rationalistic

on the assumption

awareneaa of the self
Carteaian

mode.

without

of the

prereflective

a consciousness

for Merleau-Pon~y all

in the

thought

langauge are grounded in and mediated by embodied interaction,
tacit

awareness

of the self

So, for Merleau-Ponty
primordial
which is,

would seem both poasible
there

such a

and required.

would seem to be an awareneas of a

"I" which is not an awareness of an individual
rather,

and

an awarenesa of a self

self,

which is constituted

but
aa part

of the world and other

persona.

The French word "on" conveys the

sense of such a tacit,

universal

self

"one."

In En&liah,

than the English

word

for example, we say "S0111eoneis siagioa,"

while

in French it is poaaible

to say "On cbante."

pronoun "on" is uaed to refer
peraona,

while -the Enaliah

better

either

The French indefinite

to a person or to a group of

world "one" refers

exclusively

to a single
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. d'1v1'd ua 1 •·56
in
·

tacit

"On," therefore,

cogito · because

particular

the latter

interacts

with other

self,

selves,

is a "universal

111 rather

operating

Aa was mentioned

she or he is in some sense different
and per1ons in the world.

using the first

developa

a peraon may be from others,
remains a pole or dimension
thia very individuality
within

and aa a result

provide

the necessary

an individual

self.

or diatinct

a realization

froa referring

person pronoun ''I."

can o~ly ariae,
ot such aymbiotic

according

givea riae

which ia reflected
by her name to
how different

diatinct,

force-field.

but
In fact,

to Merleau-Ponty,

relationality.

for one's

Merleau-Ponty

then,

However, no matter

in a relational

becomes aware
from the other

to heraelf

one is never totally

condition

within , the

Thus a self

Differentiation,

of individuality,

in the way a child

uiona

in the previous

are created

between the one and the many.

to a realization

111 level,

at the "universal

both a commonality and a tension

relationship

objects

than a

it becomes aware of diatinctions

and be tween them and itself.

that

when apeaking of the

one, for Merleau-Ponty.

As a nonindividuated

section,

ia aore helpful

Othera

becoming and continuing

as

puts it poignantly:

One day, once and for all,
I am a field, an experience.
aoaething was set in motion which, even during aleep, can
no lonaer ceaae to see or not to see, to feel or not to
feel, to suffer or be happy, to think or rest frOlll
thinking,
in a word to 'have it out' with the world.
There
then arose, not a new set of sensations
or states of
consciousness,
not even a new monad or a new persepctive •••
there arose a fresh possibility
& situationa ••• There was
hencefo~th ! new settin&, the world received a freah layer
7
of meaning.
Other peraona have yet another
of self-knowl _edge.
speak of and interact

It

role

to play in the development

was mentioned earlier
with other•

affecta

that

the way in which we

the way we know them.

Now
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let

us focu ·• . on the other

pbenoaenon.

Ibe way in which others

atro11& influence
exaaple,

aide of this

talk

mi &ht very well come to know biaaelf

act.

prophecy"

to and treat

on the way I know myself.

is spoken to and interacted

who calla

"aelf-fulfilliD&

If a black person,

relationships

self-identity

coaprising

for

with as a "nigger,"

be or she

or herself••

Even tbe one

one.

another person by such a name gets defined

A person'•

ae also has a

by this

very

grow• out of the dialectical

the environaeut,

both soci a l and physical,

into which they are cast.
The third
s ection

question

was this:

in the world?

that was posed at the beainnina

Ia one's

knowledae of oneself

In the first

section

world,"

and it was mentioned

i n an abstract

space.

~ather,

only known in relationship,
also not ed that

that

things

aa · tools

Things are,

called

by objects

chapter

we

"the external

thiD&• do not exist

independe

in intersubjective
its

identity

apace.

We

from these

as it were, inhabited

by us

because they are in the space which is inhabited

by our bodies.

Furth ermore, . we inhabit

made

"stuff,"

the world because we are

both we and the world ar e "flesh."

influence

of our interaction

tly

in the world are alwa y s and

the world as such gets

rela t ion s hi ps, as we ll.

affected

of the present

cona.idered our knowledge of what is often

of this

of the same

What, then,

is the

with thin&• in the world on our

knowledge of ourselves?
Merleau-Ponty
nothing

aoes so far as to say that"

but a project

at a thing

of the world. 1158 He maintains

in the world,

touch an object

••• a subject

the object

the thing

looks back at me.

touches me back.

that

ia

aa I gaze

Further,

Thia means that

aa I
as I see

84

~n object

froa a particular

perspectival

aoale

points

As l look at a cabinet,

perapective,
to the place

for instance,

I am in fact

in front

coaaunicated

to me by the objecta

a table
table,

rather

through doora,
specially

large-sized

clothea,

respectively.

results

froa our interaction

I am told

In addition,

in the world.
I as told

ay height

easier

constituted

I aee the top of

that

I aa above the

duck ay bead when going
off the floor,

or buy

I come to know myself as tall,

with objects
to aee that

the life

somehow more obvious.

of a blind

is at least

to the physical
person.

environment

SiQce a blind

observe

seeing

a blind

is interpreted

this

tells

that

of objects
seems

philosophy,

way, since

for

as touch at a distance.

When we

we can easily

person where she or he is.

the same with those of us who are not blind,

Merleau-Ponty,
What we see,

to think

peraon

and identity

Merleau-Ponty's

person walkin& down the street,

the environment
essentially

whereabouta

When considering

misleadi11&, however,

Merleau-Ponty

short,

in the world.

aelf-k.nowledae

by our relationship

in the world in COlllllunicatioa one's

is really

ia

Aa

must rely more on the sense of touch and heari11&, the role

it

that

Thu• much of what we know about ourselves

It is perhaps

when we consider

from the front,

with my feet dangling

or fat,

partly

is perceived.

If I must constantly

sit

thia

from which it

of the cabinet.

than the bottom of it,

and so on.

for example,

see bow

It is
accordin&

to

for we are "in touch" with the world through our ga&e.
as well as what we bear,

feel,

and smell,

is our way of

knowin& how and where we are located.
We realize,
to know ourselves

then,

that

in relation

in Kerleau-Ponty'a
to objects

epistemology

and other

persona

we coae
as we
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interact

·'with them.

interaction,
known.

knows itself

things

and persons.

things

there

are constantly
relationship
the parts

in and through its

is no epistemic
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